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Introduction
The immediate post-Cold War decade of 1989 to 1999 was a time of intrastate conflict
and mass violence; however, it was also a time defined by conflict resolution. Not only did
conflicts that began in this period, such as the Bosnian War, reach a peaceful end, but also
conflicts stretching much further back in time, such as the Troubles in Northern Ireland and the
Lebanese Civil War. Much attention, both in popular media and in scholarship, was paid to the
early stages of post-conflict, but each has faded into the background, only being revived around
significant anniversaries of the respective peace deals.
This project arose out of an interest in the variable stability of post-conflict states. Why
are some post-conflict states more stable than others? I have defined level of stability in this
project to have two constituent parts: level of political violence and possibility of major political
reforms. I code a state to have high stability if it has a low and dropping level of political
violence. This violence would be disconnected from political parties; in fact, when it does occur,
it would be widely condemned by all parties and not used to score political points. Furthermore,
a state with high stability would have at least one major political or constitutional reform since
the peace agreement that has marked a meaningful transition in politics. I code a state to have
low stability, however, if it has high political violence, marked by sporadic armed violence
conducted with impunity between groups tied to political parties. The level of this violence
would be strategically conducted to advance political goals of affiliated parties. States with low
stability will have not engaged in any efforts at major political or constitutional reform, despite
near universal agreement on the need for it. These states would find it difficult to form
governments and even hold elections, leaving no political will or capital for reform.
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I operate under the assumption that like any serious breakdown in trust between people,
widescale civil conflict and civil war have lasting effects, even centuries later. The United States,
as an example, is still fighting cultural battles over the memory of its civil war over 150 years
after its conclusion, in a case where military victory rather than negotiated settlement ended the
conflict. As such, all post-conflict states have some political violence and are marked by a lack
of trust causing political gridlock. However, some states have much higher levels of political
violence that is committed with near total impunity and is tied to political parties. In addition,
some states are able to break through the gridlock to create meaningful reform, while for other
states, the gridlock is utterly paralyzing to all government decisions including the formation of a
parliamentary executive and even the holding of elections. This gridlock puts the country in a
constant state of anxiety over whether the state will continue to provide the basic functions of
government and work to solve the most pressing issues facing society. This anxiety translates to
instability as the public wonders whether the state will simply fall apart.
Through my research, I became interested in the long-term roles that international actors
play in determining post-conflict stability. This project compares the case studies of Lebanon,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Northern Ireland to demonstrate the ways that international actors
have furthered peace and stability, held it back, and put their own interests above it. The criteria I
looked for in examining these cases were the number of main actors engaged with the postconflict state, the interests of the actor(s), and the degree to which the actor(s) were involved in
the state’s politics and society. In order to do this, I will provide four general models for
international engagement with post-conflict states drawn from the case studies.
The first of these models is the overlord model, exemplified by the Pax Syriana period in
Lebanon from 1989-2005. This model places a state, usually an authoritarian one, in de-facto
5

control of a post-conflict state, exercising military control and actively treating the post-conflict
state like a subject or conquered province. There may be democratic elections, but they are
gerrymandered and geared towards making sure no political group becomes powerful enough to
challenge the power of the overlord. The overlord state pursues its own agenda at the expense of
the post-conflict state. This model gives the post-conflict state a moderate level of stability. The
peace is maintained, but only because it is in the overlord’s interest to preserve stability. Political
violence is acceptable only when undertaken by the overlord or in service of the overlord’s
interests vis-à-vis the post-conflict state or other states. The level of political violence is strongly
tied to the level of control the overlord maintains. Major political reforms that solve underlying
issues at the root of conflict are not undertaken because they are not in the interest of the
overlord.
The second model is the proxy model, which is exemplified by Lebanon since the Cedar
Revolution of 2005. This model is the classic continuation of war by means of politics. Two or
more states ally themselves with an ideologically or ethnically aligned faction within a postconflict state. Ostensibly, this is to counter the efforts of another state seeking to exert its
influence, but it often involves the state asserting its own influence as well. This is typically
undertaken by regional powers seeking regional hegemony or powers competing for global
hegemony. These actors rarely get involved in the day to day acts of governance, but use their
allied factions to protect their interests and stoke tensions with their rival, at the expense of the
stability of the post-conflict state. This furthers entrenched prejudices among factions and gives
them further existential fear of a rival faction’s ascendency, now aided by a hostile foreign
power. It adds to the zero-sum nature of politics and fuels gridlock in government bodies. The
proxy model provides a low level of stability. Political violence is often rampant in this model as
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the international actors seek to advance their interests or counter the interests of their rival. They
do this by means up to and including political violence by affiliated proxies. The proxy model
further politicizes every governmental decision and inhibits all efforts at political reform.
The third model is the liberal intervention model. It is seen in the international
community’s efforts at post-conflict governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This model sees a
multinational actor or group of actors take over post-conflict statebuilding. The liberal
intervention model has some similarities with the overlord model, in that the multinational actor
gets heavily involved in acts of governance and acts supranationally to run the post-conflict state.
The multinational group may also station troops within the post-conflict state’s borders as
peacekeepers. However, the liberal intervention model differs from the overlord model in its
aims. The multinational actor’s goal is to extend liberal values, including democracy and the rule
of law. It has no territorial aspirations. While in the overlord model, the international actor may
play extreme nationalist factions off of one another to reduce the power of them both and has no
interest in promoting cross-communal groups, the main aim of the multinational group in the
liberal intervention model is to sideline hardline nationalist factions in favor of moderate and
cross-communal alternatives. The multinational group may resort to heavy-handed tactics that
circumvent the democratic process and are not subject to judicial review in order to achieve this
goal. This is often counterproductive, both strengthening hardline factions and creating a cycle of
dependency.
The liberal intervention model gives a moderate level of stability. Political violence is
strictly forbidden in this model, though it does occur and is generally tied to nationalist parties. It
occurs at higher levels than in the overlord model because the multinational actor is not as brutal
in suppressing violence outside of its control. However, while this model is not exceptionally
7

good at bringing about major political and constitutional reforms, it is better at it than the
overlord model, simply because it is in the multinational actor’s interest. The liberal intervention
model is most effective when the multinational actor only intervenes when the peace is directly
and imminently threatened and understands that post-conflict situations are inherently unstable
and stability cannot be forced, except by the specter of overwhelming violence. The main benefit
of the liberal intervention model is that it is generally successful at keeping other international
actors from interfering and thus prevents proxies from being established.
The last and most successful model is the united front model, typified by cooperation
between the UK and the Republic of Ireland in the case of Northern Ireland. In this model, two
or more nations with ideological or ethnic ties to a party to the conflict use coordinated pressure
to maintain stability and break through governing impasses. This model requires close contact
between the international actors who, despite any private differences over policy, put the peace
and stability of the post-conflict state above them and present a united front. The united front
model works most effectively when international actors use the leverage they have over domestic
allied groups to threaten consequences for intransigence. The international actors in this model
never or only very rarely put their own interests above the peace and security of the post-conflict
state. This model gives a high level of stability. Political violence is strictly forbidden in the
united front model and the connections of the international actors to the former belligerents
prove extremely useful for limiting political violence. When violence does occur, it is strongly
condemned by all domestic actors. This model is most successful at achieving major political
reforms due to the ability of the international actors to provide carrots and sticks in political
negotiations.
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Literature Review
The impact of different roles, constructive and destructive, that international actors play
in the stability of post-conflict states and these states’ ability to work through the myriad
lingering issues they face even decades after conflict is a subject without a literature of its own.
Thus, I have drawn from several different conceptual literatures and applied their insights to
those of my case studies. The first literature that is helpful in understanding this issue is the
realist literature of international relations, which provides an overarching focus on states and
their interests central to this project. The next literature is that of consociational democracy,
which is present in different forms in all of the cases studied here. Finally, this project seeks to
expand the time period of the peace agreements literature and respond to many of the
assumptions inherent in that literature.
For the purposes of this project, I employ a realist vision of international relations.
Realists such as Hans Morgenthau focus on national interests that are defined in terms of power
and security.1 Furthermore, states pursue those interests to the best of their strategic and
economic capability.2 Realism is ruled by objectivity and codified laws rather than moral
principles, which differ widely across the globe. 3 Realists divide states into status quo powers,
for whom the international system enhances their power and security and revisionist powers,
who seek to change the international system into one that aligns more closely with their
interests.4 Kenneth Waltz and the neorealists add to this conception by arguing that the

Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, Theories of International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996),
73.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid, 74.
4
Ibid, 69.
1
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international system has a precisely defined structure that is anarchical in character and is a selfhelp system.5
This project employs a realist outlook in its focus on states as the main actors and by
specifically focusing on how they pursue their interests on the international stage. Inherent in my
analysis is an understanding that status quo powers, such as the United States or the European
Union6 are invested in the stability of post-conflict states because civil warfare is not in their
interest. Revisionist powers such as Russia or Iran, however, see instability in post-conflict states
as a catalyst for desired regional or global change. There is also a third category of balancers.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Serbia, and Croatia would be considered in this group. This group
operates in the middle of status quo powers and revisionist powers. These regional powers are
connected to major status quo powers such as the European Union and the United States, but also
maintain friendly relations with revisionist powers in order to play the two sides off one another
for the greatest benefit to their state. The classic example of this is Egypt during the early stages
of the Cold War, balancing the US and Soviet Union.
The next literature relevant for understanding the cases laid out in this project is that of
consociational democracy. Arend Lijphart is considered the father of consensus democracy or
consociation theory. He argues that majoritarian Anglo-American democracy doesn’t work in
societies that are deeply divided or where such a system ensures a permanent majority for one
group. He outlines the features of a second type of democracy, consociation, as follows:
executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets, executive-legislative balance of power, a
multiparty system, proportional representation, interest group corporatism, federal and

5
6

Ibid, 84.
For the purposes of this project, the EU is treated like a state in and of itself.
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decentralized government, strong bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review, and
central bank independence.7 Using case studies from central Europe, Lijphart demonstrates that
this form of democracy allows stability in states with multiple competing nations. He argues that
elites in divided societies move towards this model because they recognize the catastrophic
consequences, namely civil war and foreign conquest, that result from disunion.8 According to
Lijphart, time is key for these democracies. The norms of consensus become more ingrained over
time, a key note for critics of the consociational model who cite states only a couple years postconflict.9
Lijphart himself delineates the drawbacks to the consociational model. He concedes that
consociation does not provide positive peace, but argues that negative peace is preferable to
undemocratic peace and unstable democracy.10 The other main drawback is that consociation can
lead to indecisiveness and inefficiency, but such is the cost of keeping the state from returning to
violence.11 In addition, on the economic front, consociation is an expensive model of democracy
due to the duplication of government offices and positions and promotes corporate bureaucracy
over a meritorious one.12 Consociation’s main critics are constructivists who believe that it
cements identities, whether they be ethnic or religious, that are malleable. Because
consociational models are based in mandating representation for specific identity groups in the
government of a state, it formalizes those identities structurally, making it difficult for national
minorities not originally represented to gain and wield power. Also, in ethnic consociations, it

7

Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 34–41.
8
Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969): 212.
9
Ibid, 216.
10
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977), 49.
11
Ibid, 50.
12
Ibid, 51.
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makes ethnically mixed people choose between identities in order to vote or seek political office.
In addition, because these constitutions are rigid, there is little ability to shift them to reflect
changes in proportionality or salience of identity over time. Thus, constructivists, who argue that
identity is not fixed, but changeable, and particularly instrumentalists, who focus on the
manipulation of identity by elites, believe that consociation simply rewards elites, who
constructed these identities and then often weaponized them, with a governmental structure built
around the identities they created.
The consociation literature does address the role of third parties, but the discussion is
underdeveloped. Lijphart argues that the threat of external actors can make consociation more
palatable to divided societies.13 However, he makes very few other comments on the subject.
John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, who have made the most significant additions to Lijphart’s
consociation theory, addressed this oversight in their analysis of their native Northern Ireland
and its negotiated settlement. McGarry and O’Leary argue that benign external interventions can
facilitate consociation in divided societies, citing the role of cross-border institutions established
by the Good Friday Agreement and the impact of the UK and the Republic of Ireland in
facilitating consociation in Northern Ireland. 14 Their insights have yet to be applied to other
cases and the role of destructive intervention on the formation and function of consociation has
yet to be seriously examined.
This project seeks to address gaps in the third parties in peace agreements literature and
stake out intellectual ground not addressed by it. This literature focuses on the question of why
peace agreements succeed or fail. As such, the literature focuses on generally the first five years

Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” 217.
John McGarry and Brendan. O’Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements (Oxford;
Oxford University Press, 2004).
13
14
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of a post-conflict state, where the cutoff for success in usually defined. This literature also
focuses heavily on the positive role of international actors and whether they are present or not. It
does not address the negative roles international actors can play. This section will first survey the
literature and then examine these oversights vis-à-vis this project.
The subject of the role of third parties in the formation and implementation of peace
agreements is a subject of much debate. Roy Licklider focuses on the role of third parties in
getting to an agreement arguing “third parties may encourage or inhibit the violence by actions
ranging from military assistance to mediation in all its forms.”15 Barbara Walter argues that civil
war combatants almost always return to war without third party enforcement and verification
measures.16 Security guarantees during demobilization are key in Walter’s conception such that
former combatants can overcome the credible commitment problem posed by lack of trust in the
immediate aftermath of civil wars.17 Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie expand on this
concept. Hartzell and Hoddie do not include third parties in their analysis of the inclusion of
power-sharing and power-dividing institutions because they would have to assume that all third
parties were in favor of these methods. 18 They make note of the disagreements between
international actors over policy. However, Hartzell and Hoddie do include third parties in their
discussions of peace agreement implementation. They posit that third parties provide security
guarantees and bridge gaps in mistrust between actors.19 This analysis focuses heavily on the role
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Roy E. Licklider, Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 16.
Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2002.
17
Ibid, 16.
18
Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated
Settlement of Civil Wars, 1 online resource (xiv, 194 pages) vols. (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2007), 56.
19
Ibid, 88.
16
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of UN peacekeepers as security guarantors.20 Hartzell and Hoddie also have a normative element
to their analysis of third parties, arguing that third parties should not impose institutions on postconflict states, rather provide institutional options and economic support to these states in their
domestic efforts to design power-sharing and power-dividing institutions.21
All of these authors focus on getting parties to agree on a negotiated settlement and the
immediate post-conflict implementation period. The literature surveyed here does not address
third parties beyond this phase. This is unsurprising considering the research questions this
literature seeks to answer are centered on what makes peace agreements successful, which is
largely determined by a measure of time, generally five years after a peace agreement, and what
makes parties return to civil warfare. This project deals with the roles of third parties in a more
comprehensive view of post-conflict states, extending two or even three decades after the initial
signing of the agreement in an effort to differentiate between the stability of states with
“successful” peace agreements.
The literature on third parties also implicitly only deals with third parties engaged in
constructive post-conflict settlement. Hartzell and Hoddie’s focus on UN peacekeepers is
indicative of this literature’s audience of policymakers in the West and in multilateral institutions
like the UN and the EU. The literature makes assumptions that these actors are the only ones that
matter for the success of peace agreements. Absent from this literature is any understanding of
the roles that destructive actors play in post-conflict states and the ways that international actors
can act as spoilers. This literature has no answer for Syria’s control over Lebanon during the Pax
Syriana. In this case, the peace was maintained such that the peace agreement would be

20
21

Ibid, 89.
Ibid, 156.
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considered successful, but the means by which this was achieved were not by any means
conducive to the long-term stability of Lebanon or the reconciliation of the former warring
parties.
This literature heavily focuses on security roles of third parties, providing a minimum of
trust between actors through security guarantees and raising the costs of renewed warfare.
However, this focus neglects the other roles that third parties play in post-conflict states. Third
parties can also act as mediators, a concept addressed in the literature, but only with respect to a
single actor mediating between parties. Multiple actors working together can also influence the
position of allied domestic actors towards compromise during an impasse. This is often more
effective, as shown by the unified front model in this project.

Methods and Case Selection
This project seeks to establish a focused theoretical framework for the issue of the role of
international actors in post-conflict states. This method seeks to “identify research problems and
offer useful conceptualizations, as well as give reason for problem choice and the conceptual
identification of relevant factors, shape the analysis of a given set of problems, and are in turn
reformulated in light of the results.”22 By addressing the gaps in the literature discussed above
and suggesting a working hypothesis through my models for other scholars to test, I “seek to
establish the most fruitful intellectual framework for the investigation” of my research
question.23 This framework allows us to identify “universal or quite general problems”24 and
“determine conceptual equivalences that cut across… contexts”25 (emphasis original). To assist

22

James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, Cambridge
Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, U.K.; Cambridge University Press, 2003), 329.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid, 330.
25
Ibid, 331.
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in doing this, I will be using the structured, focused comparison method of case study analysis. 26
This method involves asking the same general question or questions of each case in order to
standardize data collection and thus uses the same input and outputs for each case. I will
combine within-case analysis and cross-case comparison to provide the strongest means of
drawing inferences. By only dealing with certain aspects of each case, the analysis is limited to
answering these questions.
In choosing these cases, I looked for resolutions of intrastate conflicts that have met a
minimum threshold of 15 years without breaking out into renewed war. This is because I wish to
study the variations in post-conflict states with peace agreements that meet a minimum threshold
of success beyond the typical definition. I looked for cases whose conflicts ended within a
decade of one another, so that I could control for differences in time period. I also found cases in
three distinctive regions and that, with the exception of the growing role of the EU in recent
years in both Bosnia and Northern Ireland,27 have different international actors playing leading
roles. Having cases that all fall within the same time period, but are in separate regions and have
differing actors allows me to take into account differing regional contexts while keeping the
same overarching context. All three conflicts were ended by negotiated settlement, rather than
military victory and all three peace agreements resulted in consociational models of democracy,
albeit ones that differ in significant ways. All three conflicts also primarily were between ethnic
and religious groups, rather than state against citizenry. Furthermore, all three conflicts had

26

Alexander L George, and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Bcsia
Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005.
27
The EU has only really become a major actor in Northern Ireland since Brexit and while taking over most of the
OHR’s responsibilities in Bosnia, did so in a period after many of the events discussed in this project took place.
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international parties militarily involved in the conflict; as such, they straddled the divide between
civil and international conflict.
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The Overlord Model: Lebanon During the Pax Syriana (1989-2005)
Introduction
Syria’s occupation of Lebanon from the signing of the Ta’if Agreement in 1989 until the
Cedar Revolution in 2005 represents the overlord model of international engagement. This
model provides a moderate level of stability, but does so using illiberal and authoritarian means
anathema to what most people would consider constructive international engagement. The roots
of Syrian international engagement go back to its involvement in the Lebanese Civil War and its
role in Lebanon was cemented by the Ta’if Agreement, which ended the conflict.
Syria’s political project in Lebanon was to de facto make Lebanon a Syrian province. In
order to enact this political project, Syria established ties with all of Lebanon’s confessional
groups and balanced them and factions within them against one another so that no faction
became powerful or independent enough to challenge Syrian authority. Syria also became
heavily involved in Lebanese elections and integrated intelligence agents and assets in all of
Lebanon’s main industries and institutions.28 Furthermore, Syria continued to use Lebanon to
pursue its foreign policy interests, especially regional conflict with Israel.
Overall, political violence was low to moderate during the Pax Syriana. International
violence in this period between Israel and Hizballah was heavily controlled and governed by
“rules of the game.”29 Domestic political violence, however, was highly correlated to the level of
control Syria had over Lebanon. Violence was high in the first two years after the Ta’if
Agreement as Syria and the Lebanese state consolidated control, followed by a period of low

28

Bassel F Salloukh, Rabie Barakat, Jinan S Al-Habbal, Lara W Khattab, and Shoghig Mikaelian. Politics of
Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon. London: Pluto Press, 2015
29
Augustus R Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007), 83.
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political violence during the 1990s, as Syria held tight control.30 However, political violence rose
again in the first years of the new millennium, as Syria faced internal and external challenges to
its control of the country.31 In addition, Syria’s fostering of disunion within and between political
factions made the possibility of major political reforms, which most Lebanese elites and
international observers agree are needed, a non-starter during this period.
While Syria acted as the overlord in this case and thus was the main international actor
influencing Lebanon as a post-conflict state, Saudi Arabia and Iran also exerted influence in
Lebanon during this period. However, neither of those actors ever seriously challenged Syrian
hegemony. Saudi Arabia and Iran continued to build the influence that they had gained during
Lebanon’s civil war. When Syria pulled out in 2005, they filled the vacuum, becoming the
dominant international actors, marking the beginning of proxy conflict in Lebanon. This
competition will be discussed in the next chapter on the proxy model.

The Roots of Syria’s Political Project
Syria’s involvement in Lebanon stretches back to the leadup to the civil war. The Syrian
military supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization during the early 1970s, when the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), under pressure from Israel, attacked it on multiple occasions.32
The Syrians were instrumental in not only ensuring movement of supplies and fighters to the
PLO but became militarily involved in the conflicts through artillery bombardment over the
border and sending Palestinian units led by Syrian officers to assist in the fight on the ground. 33

Are Knudsen, “Acquiescence to Assassinations in Post-Civil War Lebanon?,” Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 1
(March 2010): 19.
31
Ibid.
32
Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: Centre for
Lebanese Studies, 1993), 165.
33
Ibid.
30
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During the war itself, the Syrian army was invited into Lebanon by the Lebanese President, a fact
that is often touted by Syrian elites in justifying their conduct during the war and after it.34
However, despite its attempts to erect a façade that its role was one of peacekeeping and in
support of the Lebanese sate, Syria was clearly a military actor in the conflict. Syria acted to
ensure that no actor was able to enforce its demands and win the conflict outright.35 Thus, it was
a central player in the conflict’s many changes in alliance. Anyone who has studied the Lebanese
Civil War will certainly recognize the tactics of the Syrian military in their own civil war. Syria’s
primary tactic was to bombard population centers with artillery, ostensibly to attack militants
hiding there, but very clearly to cow the civilian population into submission.36 The Syrians won
the Lebanese Civil War, not by vanquishing all of their opponents, but outlasting them.
Syria established itself as Lebanon’s overlord in the Ta’if Agreement, which ended the
Lebanese Civil War. The second and fourth sections37 of the accord were written in Damascus
and imposed upon the members of the Lebanese Parliament at Ta’if, a pattern that would
continue throughout this period. The fourth part of the second section (Second IV) reads:
The Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of Lebanese legitimacy to spread the
authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning
with the ratification of the National Accord document, the election of a President of the
Republic, the formation of the National Accord cabinet, and the constitutional approval
of the political reforms. At the end of this period, the two governments… shall decide to
redeploy the Syrian forces… at points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian
military committee. An agreement shall be also be concluded by the two governments to
determine the extent and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the abovementioned areas and to define the relation of these forces within the Lebanese State
authorities in the places of their deployment.38

34

Ibid, 210.
Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation, 217.
36
Ibid, 234.
37
These sections concerned Lebanese territorial security and Syrian-Lebanese relations.
38
“The Ta’if Agreement: English Translation,” September 1989,
https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf.
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The text at first read seems to ensure that Syria will respect Lebanese sovereignty and assist it to
control its own borders before withdrawing after two years. However, a close reading finds the
language hollow and ripe for exploitation. This section gives no firm withdrawal timetable for
Syrian troops, essentially allowing them to stay in Lebanon indefinitely, which is of course what
they did. Syria, being the more powerful party, had firm control over the country and the
Lebanese government by the time the two years had passed, allowing it to implement the Ta’if
Agreement in a way that suited its own interests at the expense of Lebanon and its post-conflict
recovery.

Syria’s Overlordship
Syria achieved its interest of the de facto rule of Lebanon maintaining complete control
over the country’s politics and society. No part of Lebanese society was left unaffected by Syria
and its Lebanese allies. Syria ruled by knowing everything that was happening using its large
intelligence apparatus and by divide and conquer. It pitted Lebanese confessions against one
another while also dividing them internally. Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad then acted as
monarch, giving a final verdict on all disputes that arose.39 On top of that, Syria manipulated
elections to ensure that favorable candidates were ensured victory and entrance into Parliament.
Syria had a heavy hand in Lebanese politics and society. All major decisions were made
with Syrian approval and political leaders of all parties were routinely summoned to Damascus.40
Syria also insisted on being consulted on cabinet formation and held de facto veto power over the
positions of Prime Minister, President, and Speaker of the Parliament.41 Political success in
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Lebanon depended not on being representative of one’s constituents, but one’s relationship with
major Syrian elites, especially Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar, Syrian Vice President Abdul
Halim Khaddam, and the head of Syrian Military Intelligence in Lebanon General Ghazi
Kennan.42 Lebanese military positions were always appointed with Syrian approval.43 Lebanese
officers also began to train at Syria’s military academy at Homs, subjecting them to Syrian
political propaganda and integrating them with Syria’s occupying military force of 40,000
soldiers.44 In addition, Syrian intelligence operatives and their Lebanese allies were present in
almost all of Lebanon’s civil, political, and security institutions and organizations.45 Syrian
agents infiltrated nearly all of Lebanon’s media and civil society organizations as well, while the
judiciary toed the Syrian line.46
Syria’s heavy involvement also extended to elections. Syria approved an election law
ahead of the 1992 elections that heavily gerrymandered electoral districts to allow for the
election of candidates it backed and the defeat of those it opposed.47 This law also
disenfranchised the tens of thousands of Lebanese, mainly Christians, who had fled abroad.48 It
also made most of those who were still internally displaced ineligible to vote.49 40
parliamentarians were appointed by Syria through their representatives in the Lebanese
government in advance of the 1992 election to fill the seats of those who had died since the most
recent election in 1972 and the 29 seats added to Parliament by the Ta’if Agreement. Three times
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Syria amended the Lebanese Constitution to make a pro-Syria presidential candidate eligible for
the position because it found no other suitable candidates,50 once to make LAF commander
Emile Lahoud eligible, and the other two times to give Elias Hrawi and Lahoud second six-year
terms. 51
Fomenting internal disunion within Lebanon’s confessional groups and their political
parties was an effective tactic that the Syrians employed to great effect in Lebanon in order to
ensure that no faction became powerful enough to challenge Syrian rule. Syria did this by
reducing the political power of Lebanese Christian parties and then internally fracturing them
between pro and anti-Syrian factions. It also empowered the Shi’a political parties, which had
been the least powerful in Lebanon.52 Rounding out the three major confessions, Syria balanced
Sunni factions against one another, supporting one whenever the others became too powerful.
Syria sought to greatly diminish the power of the Christian parties, which had been the
most vocal opponents of Syrian rule. In 1992, heavily pro-Syrian candidate lists in Christian
districts led Christian political leaders and the Maronite Patriarch to call on Christians to boycott
the elections.53 Their gamble to have the elections postponed due to mass outcry and fear of
illegitimacy backfired. Their appeal for the international community’s attention and that pressure
be put on Syria to delay fell on deaf ears, as the region and the world focused on the Gulf War.54
The result was between 5% and 20% turnout among Christians in the 1992 election and the
almost complete withdrawal of traditional Christian parties from Parliament.55 Christian parties
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had good reason to boycott. The 1992 election law featured not only flagrant gerrymandering in
favor of pro-Syrian candidates, but also had an uneven regional distribution, inflating the power
of rural areas close to Syria at the expense of cities and heavily populated areas.56 Christian
parties also boycotted the elections in 1996, though this time they were not joined by the
Maronite Patriarch.57
In addition, Syria managed to create a major split among Christian elites in the early
2000s. After the 2000 legislative elections, Syria and its Lebanese allies held secret negotiations
with the Maronite Church, the heads of important Christian political dynasties, and the
leadership of former militias in order to create a coalition of Christian leaders willing to abandon
their demands for Syrian withdrawal.58 Syria offered cultural autonomy and protection of
Christian political privileges in return.59 This internally split the Lebanese Forces and Kata’ib
parties, pitting pro-Syrian politicians against those arguing for Syrian withdrawal. The proSyrian faction engaged in a campaign to control and marginalize this opposition, further
fracturing Christian political unity.60 Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement was left the only
staunch opponent to Syrian presence in Lebanon of the three main Christian parties.61
Syria also worked to balance Sunni factions off one another. While Rafiq Hariri had close
ties to Syria and its backing as the leader of the largest Sunni political party, it balanced him
against his main political rivals Salim al-Hoss and Omar Karami.62 In 1998, with Syrian
approval, President Emile Lahoud appoint al-Hoss Prime Minister over Hariri. This was likely
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the result of the growing influence of Bashar al-Assad, who took over the Lebanon portfolio in
the years preceding his father’s death.63 While Hariri maintained close ties with Bashar’s father
Hafez al-Assad and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, Hariri’s relationship with
Bashar al-Assad was frostier.64 It is likely that Bashar also wanted to reduce the influence of
Saudi Arabia, Hariri’s other nationality, in Lebanon. In addition, whenever Syria wished to send
a cautionary message to Hariri, an influential Syrian elite would publicly support Karami or
appear in public with him. For example, the Syrian Vice President attended the commemoration
of Karami’s brother’s assassination in June of 2000, just before the 2000 elections, at a time
when tensions were rising between Hariri and Syria due to Bashar’s accession to the Syrian
Presidency after the death of his father.65

Lebanese Stability During the Pax Syriana
Political violence in the Pax Syriana must be differentiated between international and
domestic political violence. International political violence was closely managed. An acceptable
level of violence was set between Israel and Hizballah and was more or less constant, excepting
flareups in 1993 and 1996. Domestic political violence, however, was much more closely tied to
the control Syria had over the country. The main form of political violence in Lebanon, from the
civil war to the modern day, is the assassination of elites, particularly by car bomb.66 The early
period post-Ta’if of 1990-91 involved mass political violence as Syria and the Lebanese state
eliminated spoilers and disarmed militias. 1992 and 1993 were incredibly calm for domestic
political violence, as Syria cemented control and began repressing activism and dissent,
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particularly among Lebanese Christians. This period of relative calm brought on by Syrian
repression lasted through the rest of the 1990s Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon and
the death of Hafez al-Assad, both in 2000, marked Syria’s decline in Lebanon. Violence in this
period dramatically increased as repression and power struggles intensified.
The Pax Syriana was characterized by controlled international political violence.
Hizballah and Israel established what came to be known as the “rules of the game” via oral
agreement 1993 after Israel launched Operation Accountability aimed at curtailing Hizballah.67
The rules of the game were that Israel would not attack civilian targets and Hizballah would limit
their attacks to Israeli controlled Southern Lebanon.68 While Hizballah did not coordinate with
Syria or act on Syrian orders to attack Israel, there is some indication that they notified Syria of
impending attacks.69 In addition, Syria made no move to disarm the group and Hizballah resisted
all Syrian efforts to reign them in.70 Indeed, Syria along with Iran armed Hizballah. Most conflict
between Hizballah and Israel was actually conducted between Hizballah and Israel’s militia, the
South Lebanese Army (SLA), which occupied a strip of Southern Lebanon and acted as a buffer
force. Thus, the rules of the game were adhered to.
During the Lebanese Civil War, a Christian unit of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
attempted to establish a buffer zone on the Israeli-Lebanese border to prevent attacks by the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and reprisals by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF),
thereby protecting Lebanese citizens, particularly Lebanese Christians, from these attacks.71 The
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LAF eventually disbanded this unit, but the Israelis began to supply it as a buffer force and thus
the SLA was born and became one of the many foreign supplied militias fighting in Lebanon’s
civil war.72 Following the Ta’if Agreement, Israel prevented the LAF from disarming the SLA in
light of continuing attacks from Hizballah.73 The SLA remained until 2000 when Israel
unilaterally withdrew its support for the militia and its territory was quickly overrun by Hizballah
fighters.
While the SLA was an Israeli proxy, it is not accurate to characterize Lebanon at this
time as part of the proxy model due to two important factors. The first of these is that the SLA’s
primary role was that of a buffer force between the Israeli border and Hizballah in Southern
Lebanon. It might be more accurate to call Israel the overlord of the small strip of land that the
SLA, later supplemented by IDF troops, controlled. Thus, the SLA had no impact on Lebanese
society or politics outside of the area it controlled and was treated by the rest of the country as an
area under enemy occupation. The SLA was not a proxy dedicated to expanding the influence of
its benefactor at the expense of another state and made no effort to expand the territory it
controlled. The second reason is the sheer control that the Syrian state had over Lebanon and its
depth of influence in all sectors of society means that there was no space for overt proxies.
Both Hizballah and Israel routinely broke the rules of the game and in 1996 it resulted in
large-scale Israeli military action.74 The IDF launched Operation Grapes of Wrath after Israel
mistakenly launched a missile that killed two civilians and Hizballah responded by launching
missiles into Northern Israel.75 Israel’s goal, as it had been with previous invasions against the
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PLO in Lebanon, was to get Syria to reign in Hizballah and undermine their public support.76
This backfired completely for the Israelis, as it resulted in a massacre at the ancient village of
Qana and the bombing of a UN base, killing 106 civilians.77 Israel claimed the latter was
unintentional; however, the UN, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch all challenge
that claim strongly.78 The seventeen day conflict resulted in 170 deaths.79 The resolution of
Operation Grapes of Wrath involved the parties again agreeing to the rules of the game, this time
on an unsigned piece of paper and provisions for a group of the US, France, Israel, Lebanon, and
Syria to monitor violations.80
Domestic political violence in Lebanon was heavily correlated with Syria’s level of
control. Political violence was higher at the beginning and end of the Pax Syriana when Syria
was still cementing its control over the country and when it began to lose control than in the
middle period where it had more or less full control over Lebanon. Culpability for acts of
political violence in Lebanon is difficult to establish due to the vast majority of assassinations
remaining unsolved.81 This also makes it difficult to differentiate between those committed by
state actors, Lebanese, Syrian, and Israeli, and those committed by domestic political factions.
All attributions of responsibility in this section are presumed, but not confirmed.
The immediate aftermath of the Ta’if Agreement from 1989-1991 contained high levels
of political violence, to the point that this period is sometimes included as part of the civil war.
Commander of the LAF Michel Aoun rejected the Ta’if Agreement over concerns about the lack
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of timetable for Syrian withdrawal, seized the Presidential Palace, dissolved Parliament, and
named himself President.82 The members of Parliament, who signed the Ta’if Agreement and did
not recognize Aoun’s move, elected Rene Moawad president.83 An uneasy standoff ensued for
the next several months, until Moawad was assassinated by car bomb in November 1989.84
Moawad was one of five Lebanese elites assassinated in this three-year period, while there were
attempts on two others.85 Elias Hrawi was soon appointed President and agreed to a military
offensive against Aoun and his supporters in 1990, causing him to seek refuge in the French
Embassy and eventually exile in France.86 The LAF proceeded to fight small skirmishes with
heavily depleted and war-weary Palestinian groups and reduced their territory to the Palestinian
refugee camps.87 These actions cemented the Lebanese state’s rule over the vast majority of
Lebanon’s territory and with it Syria’s control over Lebanon.
The rest of the 1990s had low levels of political violence. Syria instituted state repression,
especially of Maronite Christian activists. Hundreds of people were arrested and tortured.88 In
1993, the LAF was called in against student demonstrators.89 The mid-1990’s marked a slight
increase in sectarian violence including the bombing of a church in a village near Beirut in 1994
that killed 10 people.90 There were also several instances of fighting between rival Islamist
groups.91 There were seven assassinations of elites in this eight-year period including four judges
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gunned down in a courtroom in 1999, marking only four distinct assassination attempts.92 This is
a marked decrease from the early period, with just over half as many attempts in a period almost
twice as long.
The turn of the millennium was also a turning point for Syrian control in Lebanon. The
Israelis withdrew from Southern Lebanon, putting a spotlight on Syrian military presence. In
addition, longtime Syrian ruler Hafez al-Assad died, leaving power to his son Bashar. This led to
a short period of instability within Syria as Bashar consolidated power, taking it away from the
old guard. This had ramifications in Lebanon. There were six assassinations and one attempt in
this five-year period, not counting Rafiq Hariri’s.93 Syria began cracking down hard on activists
urging withdrawal as Lebanese and international pressure grew. Reconciliation between the
Maronite Patriarch and Walid Jumblatt, head of the majority Druze Progressive Socialist Party
led to a mass crackdown on anti-Syrian opposition in 2002.94 This was also the year that five of
the assassinations in this period took place.95 In 2002 and 2004, two Maronite Christian student
activists were tortured and killed, sparking protests.96 These killings are likely to have been
committed by the Syrian government. There was also an assassination attempt on a Druze MP
who voted against the constitutional amendment allowing Emile Lahoud to stay on as
President.97 Assassinations likely committed by foreign actors also came back in this period.
Former Maronite MP, minister, and militia leader Elie Houbeika and one of his associates were
assassinated in separate incidents in 2002, as Houbeika had declared his intention to speak about
his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacres, widely considered the worst of the civil war, as part
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of a war crimes lawsuit against former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.98 While these
assassinations, like the vast majority of those described here are unsolved, the Israelis are
suspected. All of this violence culminated in the assassination of Former Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri in February 2005, sparking the Cedar Revolution, which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
Syria controlled Lebanese politics to the degree that if they had wished, they could have
forced through major constitutional reforms. However, the Lebanese constitutional system with
its multiple appointed executive positions and complex election procedures made it easier for
Syria to manipulate through gerrymandering and exerting its influence. Furthermore, as has been
shown, Syria benefitted from controlled tension between Lebanon’s confessional groups. Syria
had no incentive to reform Lebanon’s gridlocked consociational government. As such, there
were no major attempts at constitutional reform during this period, with the exception of Syria
amending the constitution thrice to allow its preferred candidate to hold the position of President.
Options for major constitutional reform have remained essentially the same since the Ta’if
Agreement and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

The Rise of Proxies
Several events of the first years of the new millennium marked the decline of Syria’s
control over Lebanon. As this happened, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had been building up their
influence since the civil war, were in prime position to fill the vacuum left by Syria’s
withdrawal. The first blows to Syria’s legitimacy and control in Lebanon came in the year 2000.
As discussed in the previous section, the death of Hafez al-Assad and Israeli withdrawal from
Lebanon were serious blows to Syria. These two events meant that while Bashar al-Assad was
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focused on consolidating power around his new rule on the home front, Israeli withdrawal
brought increasing pressure to withdraw from the US and the UN. In addition, the events of 9/11
further constrained Syria by bringing US and Western attention back firmly to the Middle East
and the creation of the “state sponsor of terror” designation significantly impacted Syria’s
material and diplomatic support to Hizballah.99
Saudi Arabia, ever since the Ta’if Agreement has seen its role in Lebanon to be the
protector of Sunni interests. As such, the Kingdom has given monetary, political, and diplomatic
support to the Sunni-majority Future Movement led by Rafiq Hariri. Gulf investors were central
to Hariri’s project of rebuilding downtown Beirut after the civil war.100 In addition, Hariri
pegged the Lebanese currency to the US dollar in 1999, which meant that Lebanon began to take
on massive debt levels. This was maintained by foreign investment, largely from Gulf states
including primarily Saudi Arabia.101 The Saudis have long been wary of rising Iranian influence
in Lebanon. Before 2005, Saudi Arabia had reasonable relations with Syria and played an
important role in mediating between the US and Syria in the early 2000s over Syrian withdrawal
from Lebanon.102 It attempted to work out a deal where Syria would withdrawal its troops from
Lebanon in exchange for a reduction in US pressure.103
Connection between Iran and Hizballah goes back to the foundation of the latter in the
early 1980s. Iran was Hizballah’s main financial and military backer all through the latter half of
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the civil war.104 Iranian pressure on Syria prevented the LAF from disarming Hizballah in
1990.105 In the meantime, Iran continued to supply arms, including heavy weapons to Hizballah,
such that it is now a stronger military force than the LAF.106 Iranian was also the main driver
behind Hizballah’s non-disarmament after Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon.107 In the
aftermath of Israeli withdrawal, pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian factions emerged within the
organization. The pro-Iranian faction advocated further hostilities with Israel, focusing on the
Shebaa Farms disputed border area.108 The pro-Syrian faction meanwhile urged restraint within
the group. This reflected Syrian pullback from anti-Israeli activities post-9/11 for fear of being
labeled a state sponsor of terror.109 The pro-Iranian faction prevailed in that struggle and
Hizballah began attacks on the Shebaa Farms region; however, they did not notify Syria of these
attacks for fear that the Syrians would betray them to the Israelis.110
Saudi Arabia and Iran had established strong relations with the Future Movement and
Hizballah going back to the end of the civil war and continued to build those relationships over
the course of the Pax Syriana. However, these relationships and any rivalry between the two
states was under Syria’s overarching occupation. When the Syrians withdrew from Lebanon and
their grip of the country went away, Saudi Arabia and Iran filled in the vacuum. Now instead of a
dominant overlord, international influence was split between two ideologically opposed powers,
which already had significant influence over rival domestic factions.
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The Proxy Model: Lebanon After the Cedar Revolution (2005-)
Introduction
The Cedar Revolution, following the dramatic assassination of Rafik Hariri by massive
car bomb on February 14, 2005, resulted in Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Hariri’s
assassination brought tens of thousands of people into the streets first on March 8th in a pro-Syria
demonstration led by Hizballah and Amal and then a much larger demonstration on March 14th
telling the Syrians it was time for them to leave Lebanon. While Syria continued to exert some
influence in the country, Saudi Arabia and Iran became the main foreign influencers in Lebanon.
These two nations have been locked in a regional rivalry that has intensified since the invasion of
Iraq in 2003 and again following the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), otherwise known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. This rivalry has resulted in several proxy
wars, the most prominent examples of which are the Syrian Civil War and the war in Yemen.
Continuing conflict in Iraq since the 2003 invasion has also taken on characteristics of proxy
warfare.
Lebanon has not been immune from this type of proxy conflict; however, it has not
resulted in all out warfare thus far. The Saudi relationship with the Sunni Future Movement, now
led by Rafiq Hariri’s son Saad, has only increased in this period. The same is true of Iranian
support for Hizballah. Saudi Arabia and Iran have clearly put their own interests in the rivalry for
regional hegemony over the interests of peace and stability in Lebanon. Both states have
undertaken major destabilizing actions in Lebanon that have raised tensions and fears and even
brought Lebanon to the brink of renewed civil warfare. External benefaction has brought fresh
divisions between the two sides and have made efforts at unity nearly impossible. That being
said, Saudi Arabia and Iran have seldom resorted to direct interference in Lebanese society and
34

politics of the kind that Syria engaged in, preferring to act through their proxies. The proxy
model in Lebanon has resulted in a low level of stability marked by a high level of political
violence and continuing non-viability of major political reforms. Basic governing has been
inhibited by this model as well. The end of Syria’s overlordship removed the final arbiter of all
disputes and the past 14 years have been characterized by infrequent elections, long periods of
unelected shadow governments, and frequent gridlock. It is remarkable that Lebanon has not
succumbed to renewed warfare under these conditions.

Regional Hegemony in the Middle East
In the aftermath of the Cedar Revolution, new political power blocs were created. Two
alliances, the pro-Syrian March 8 alliance and the anti-Syrian March 14 alliance grew out of the
two major protests in Lebanon following Rafiq Hariri’s assassination. The March 8 alliance is
primarily made up of the Shi’a parties Hizballah and Amal and in a strange turn of events the
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by a returned Michel Aoun111. The FPM entered into an
electoral alliance with Hizballah in the late 2000s and has represented the pro-Syrian Christian
wing. The March 14 alliance is primarily made up of the Future Movement, as well as the
Christian parties of Kata’ib and Lebanese Forces, which morphed into political parties following
their disarmament as militias. While initially these alliances were centered around Lebanon’s
relationship with Syria, the largest parties within them, the Future Movement and Hizballah,
have increasingly become proxies in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years.
The greatly diminished power of Lebanon’s Christians is a testament to the power of
outside actors in Lebanese politics. Defined by opposition to Syria and political boycotts,
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Lebanese Christians found themselves without an external benefactor as Saudi and Iranian
patronage of Sunni and Shi’a respectively dramatically increased. The division between
Christian parties orchestrated by the Syrians during the Pax Syriana has continued in the division
of Christian parties between the March 8 and March 14 alliance and has been unaffected by the
transition of the alliances along the Saudi-Iranian axis. As such, Christians continue to be
politically divided and subordinated under Sunni and Shi’a parties.
Since 2005, Saudi Arabia and Israel’s interests in Lebanon have grown closer together.
Both states are invested in countering the influence of Iran, especially through its proxy,
Hizballah. For Israel, the concern is security, as Iran increasingly seeks to become the new
champion of the Palestinian cause and is increasingly aggressive towards Israel. Iran has begun
shipping weapons and aid to Hamas in Gaza and fomenting militant action among Palestinians
against Israel, in addition to its support for Hizballah on Israel’s northern border.112 Countering
Iran and Hizballah is a paramount security issue for Israel. In the last few years, Saudi Arabia
and Israel have increased ties, holding friendly bilateral ties and opening Saudi airspace to planes
with Israeli destinations.113 The two states have created an informal alliance firmly aimed at Iran,
partly due to US withdrawal from the region and increasing wariness towards its alliances with
both states.114
Syria’s interests in this period have become much closer to those of Iran. As the region
has increasingly been split along sectarian lines at the political level, Syria’s Alawite Shi’a
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government has become much closer tied to Iran. Also, while in previous years Syria has eyed
Iran warily, the Syrian Civil War has made the two allies of necessity. Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard Corps has been active in the conflict and Iranian bases in Syria have been the subject of
several Israeli airstrikes.115 As the Syrian government has framed the conflict in more and more
sectarian terms, aid from their fellow Shi’a state has increased. Syrian actions towards Lebanon
in this period have been aimed at two main goals. The first is to ensure that the country is never
implicated for any of the crimes and abuses it committed both during the Lebanese Civil War
and the Pax Syriana, especially the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. The second is to politically aid
Hizballah and other Shi’a groups against the Future Movement and the other members of the
March 14 Alliance.
Saudi Arabia, Israel, Hizballah as Iran’s proxy, and Syria have all taken major
destabilizing actions in Lebanon that have threatened the state and its stability over the last 14
years in order to combat a threat to its interests or put pressure on the other side. Most recently,
in 2017, the Saudis asserted their influence in Lebanon by essentially kidnapping Lebanese
Prime Minister Saad Hariri. In a truly bizarre incident, Hariri, on a visit to Saudi Arabia was
summoned to the Saudi royal offices, stripped of his cell phone, separated from his bodyguards
and given a prewritten resignation speech to read on Saudi television, blaming Iran for the
sudden move.116 Hariri rescinded his resignation upon returning to Lebanon after diplomatic
pressure from the West released him from Saudi Arabia.117 This brazen move backfired on the
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Kingdom and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, but it serves as an example of Saudi
Arabia’s willingness to violate Lebanese sovereignty for its own regional interests.
The 2006 Israeli invasion, while a defeat for Israel, showed that they were willing to
sacrifice Lebanese stability to combat Iranian control by proxy of southern Lebanon. The conflict
was sparked when a Hizballah cross border raid killed three IDF soldiers and captured two
more.118 The response took a familiar pattern. The Israelis responded by invading southern
Lebanon and bombing both military and civilian targets including Rafiq Hariri International
Airport.119 They also established a naval and air blockade. The conflict was fought over 33 days
and resulted in a stalemate. The conflict killed an estimated 1100-1300 Lebanese and destroyed
much of Lebanon’s infrastructure which was still being rebuilt from the civil war.120 The
bombing campaign destroyed 400 miles of road, 73 bridges, utilities stations, including power
plants and water treatment centers, 25 fuel stations, 350 schools, two hospitals, and some 15,000
homes.121 The invasion backfired not only because Hizballah held out against the numerically
and technologically superior IDF, but Hizballah gained legitimacy in its role as a check on Israeli
aggression with the Lebanese public, despite instigating the conflict.
Hizballah has been the most destabilizing actor in Lebanon. Since Syrian withdrawal,
Hizballah has been much more aggressive in challenging the Lebanese state. It is widely
believed that Hizballah carried out the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in
2005 on the orders of Syria, sparking the Cedar Revolution that forced Syrian withdrawal. In
2008, it turned its guns directly against the state, following the government’s declaration of
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Hizballah’s parallel communication network to be illegal.122 In response, it occupied West Beirut
and fought street battles with Sunni militiamen tied to the Future Movement who were in power
at the time. This return to militia-based fighting in Beirut brought back stark memories of the
Lebanese Civil War and is the closest Lebanon has come to a return to full-fledged civil warfare.
The fighting lasted roughly one week before the LAF intervened and forced a ceasefire. In that
time, it killed 65 people and wounded more than 200.123 The parties signed the Doha Agreement,
in which the government backed down from its earlier declaration. There is little indication that
Iran played a role in starting the conflict, but its weapons shipments to Hizballah were central to
having the capability to engage in this conflict. Despite getting the government to back down,
Hizballah came out negatively from this conflict. By challenging the state, it lost more
legitimacy than it had gained during the Israeli invasion and turned many Lebanese Sunni firmly
against the group.
The Syrians and Iranians have again played a direct role in undermining Lebanese
sovereignty in recent years. Most recently, in 2012, the head of the Intelligence branch of the
Lebanese Internal Security Forces was assassinated by car bomb. This attack had remarkable
similarities to the one that killed Hariri and almost sent Lebanon into a new round of sectarian
warfare. It is suspected that Syrian intelligence carried out the assassination, aided by Iran, in
order to drag Lebanon into civil conflict that would mirror the Syrian Civil War.124 Hizballah
came out and strongly condemned the assassination.125 It is believed that the assassination of the
ISF Intelligence branch head was done without the involvement of Hizballah.
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In 2012, Hizballah entered the Syrian Civil War on the side of the Syrian government.
Militiamen have been seen fighting alongside regular units of the Syrian Army against rebel
forces. Initially, it appeared that Hizballah had limited its engagement to holding strategically
located villages with significant Shi’a population of Lebanese citizenship.126 However, by 2013,
Hizballah was fully enmeshed in the conflict, undertaking military operations in full coordination
with the regime, including sending 2000 fighters to the battle for Aleppo.127 Hizballah has
declared that it is in Syria to protect against the rise of Islamic extremists.128 However, it is hard
to believe that Hizballah would do this without some pressure from Tehran, since relations
between Hizballah and Syria have never been particularly close. The two have been referred to
as allies of convenience.129 Military involvement in the Syrian conflict has opened Lebanon up
as a target for attacks from Sunni militant groups, which will be developed further in the next
section.

Lebanese Instability After the Cedar Revolution
This period in Lebanese history has been referred to as a “cold civil war.”130 Including
Rafiq Hariri’s, there were 16 assassinations of Lebanese elites and four attempted assassinations
just between 2005 and 2009, marking a substantial increase from any period during the Pax
Syriana.131 In addition, militias have rearisen, closely linked to political parties and their leaders.
At times, these militias have fought street battles in Beirut and Tripoli, marking a new type of
sectarian conflict. Several of the events described in the previous paragraph included heavy
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incidents of political violence. It is difficult to separate instances of foreign interference in
Lebanon over the last fourteen years from the political violence that has accompanied it.
Following the end of the Israeli invasion, domestic political violence broke out in full
force in 2007. After Hizballah and Amal withdrew their cabinet ministers in October 2006 over
disagreements having to do with the ratification of the international tribunal into the
assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Pierre Gemayel Jr. was assassinated in a drive-by shooting.132 He
represented the third member of his family to be assassinated in the preceding 25 years. Violence
soon turned sectarian as young men were killed in demonstrations, student clashes, and street
brawls.133 A bus bombing in February 2007, killing four Maronite commuters, added to the
tension.134 In May of that year, fighting broke out between the LAF and Fatah al-Islam, a SalafiJihadist group that had taken over a Palestinian refugee camp outside Tripoli.135 After three
months of fighting, the camp was destroyed and 500 people were dead, including 250 militants,
169 LAF troops, and 47 Palestinians. Another two assassinations of MPs took place in 2007,
both heavily linked to political aims.136 In this environment, militias rearose and symbols and
habits from the civil war reappeared.137
Hizballah has been both a perpetrator and a target of political violence in Lebanon. It is
strongly believed that Hizballah carried about the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri in 2005, a belief supported by the fact that Hizballah is also suspected in the assassinations
of multiple heads of the investigation into Hariri’s death. Hizballah has been active in the Syrian
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conflict since 2012 and has made Lebanon a party to the conflict. In response, Salafi-jihadist
groups such as al Nusra Front have attacked Hizballah offices and assassinated Hizballah
military figures in Lebanon.138 These attacks have also killed and wounded numerous civilians,
uninvolved in the conflict. There have been at least ten major attacks targeting Hizballah,
Lebanese Shi’a, or the Lebanese government perpetrated by Salafi Jihadist groups since 2013.139
In addition, fighting has broken out at various times over the last decade in Tripoli
between the poor Sunni neighborhood of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the wealthier hilltop
neighborhood of Jabal Mohsen inhabited by the Alawite140 Shi’a minority.141 The violence has
killed 141 people between 2008 and 2013.142 This conflict has mirrored the Syrian Civil War due
to Tripoli’s proximity to the Syrian border and the close religious makeup of the city to nearby
Syrian towns.143 The fighting has been marked by the reemergence of militias, bringing concern
to those who remember the civil war. Both the Arab Alawite Democratic Party (ADP), with its
Red Knights militia and former Sunni Prime Minister Nijab Mikati, who is close to the Assad
family, have funneled weapons and money into the conflict.144 On the other side, former LAF
officers close to the Future Movement have armed and funded assassinations and attacks on local
pro-Assad leaders and political parties.145 Violence targeting Alawite citizens has also been
rampant. The burning and destruction of Alawite shops is common.146 Twin bombings of Sunni
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mosques killed over 40 people in November of 2013 and wounded over 400.147 The leader of the
ADP, which has close ties to Syria, was charged with smuggling a suspect in the bombing out of
Tripoli. Violence and intimidation by militants have gone unimpeded by security forces, even in
administrative buildings.148 Armed clashes in late May and early June 2013 killed over 40
people.149 Violence in Tripoli typifies the violence occurring in Lebanon over the last decade and
a half.
Recent developments in Lebanon are worrying for the state’s ability to solve these issues.
Lebanon held parliamentary elections in May of 2018 after having postponed them three times
since they were originally scheduled in 2013. In the meantime, Lebanon was run by a shadow
government as the two alliances failed to agree on an election law.150 The March 8 Alliance did
very well in the 2018 elections with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement headed by Michel
Aoun, who is currently serving as Lebanese President, Hizballah, and Amal all gaining seats,
while Saad Hariri’s Future Movement lost over a third of its seats. However, talks over forming a
cabinet lasted nine months with Hariri refusing to allow any politicians from Hizballah’s lists
into the cabinet.151 A new government was finally announced at the end of January 2019, with
Hizballah able to choose the new Minister of Education, as long as he is not one of Hizballah’s
candidates.152
The regional dynamic has undermined domestic efforts to reform Lebanon’s politics.
There is a broad consensus among elites that it would be ideal to move to a non-confessional
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system, where seats and ministerial positions are not given based confessional proportionality,
albeit large confessional groups are move supportive than small ones.153 The Shi’a are most
supportive of rapid deconfessionalization as they are most disadvantaged by the current system.
Sunnis and Christians are supportive of more gradual deconfessionalization with robust
guarantees of minority rights.154 The Druze and Armenian minorities are completely against the
idea, as the confessional system allows them disproportionate power to their size.155 The Ta’if
Agreement also speaks of a Senate to be created when the parliament is deconfessionalized that
would still contain sectarian confessionalism, but would only rule on existential and
humanitarian questions. The Druze are in favor of this idea especially, since under the Ta’if
Agreement, a member of the Druze community would lead this body.156 However, as long as the
desired reforms such as deconfessionalization and the disarmament of Hizballah are seen in the
eyes of Saudi Arabia and Iran to benefit their rival, political, economic, and diplomatic pressure
will enforce the status quo.
Lebanese elites would also like to see a number of reforms passed aimed at peacebuilding
and transitional justice. They put strong emphasis on education reform, especially pertaining to
national civil education and the establishment of a Lebanese national identity.157 They would
also like to establish an independent judiciary that would remove sectarian influence on court
proceedings.158 The establishment of new cross-confessional political parties is another goal.159
In addition, the memory of the civil war must be dealt with in order to move onto a new better
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system. The general amnesia about the events of the civil war has been detrimental to Lebanese
society. There has been little to no effort put into addressing the wounds of war and bringing
coexistence and individual reconciliation to a country that lost over 150,000 souls to brutal,
chaotic civil war.160 However, as both sides remain in an uneasy standoff between regional
powers, these hopes and aspirations remain pipe dreams only expressed in interviews without
any real momentum towards actually achieving them.

Lebanon’s Future
Lebanon, of the three cases discussed here, appears to be the closest to a return to civil
war. All three cases are currently typified by large constitutional and political problems and
political gridlock; however, Lebanon has the highest level of political violence and the most
potential for a rapid increase in political violence. Regional dynamics and the roles and relative
power of international actors would not have to shift in Lebanon for renewed large scale civil
violence to occur. It is also the only case studied here to have no separation between political
parties and political violence. With the exception of violence from international militant groups
and foreign states, all political violence in Lebanon has been undertaken by groups tied to
political parties. So long as Lebanon’s neighborhood is as violent as it has become and Saudi
Arabia and Iran are locked in fierce rivalry over regional hegemony, Lebanon will remain
profoundly unstable and be a prime candidate for renewed violence.
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The Liberal Intervention Model: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Introduction
The Bosnian War was the worst conflict on European soil since World War II. The
Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the conflict, provided the basis for a massive statebuilding
project led by the international community. The results of this unprecedented endeavor have
been mixed. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has not returned to the brutal violence of the early
1990s. However, the first year of implementation was chaotic, uncoordinated, and unproductive.
In the years that followed, all progress towards implementing the Dayton Accords and
addressing myriad issues of running a government has been made either by intense international
pressure or by international fiat. The international community and the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) have acted supranationally, pushing through policies aimed at overcoming
sectarian division and promoting reconciliation over the objections of democratically elected
politicians. This practice has reinforced intransigence among Bosnia’s political parties and has
trampled Bosnian sovereignty and Bosnians’ democratic rights.
The OHR has acted with what the international community believes to be Bosnia’s
interest and its efforts have been aimed at promoting human rights, conflict resolution, peace,
and stability in Bosnia. It has attempted to foster unity among Bosnia’s ethnic groups, but for the
most part, its actions have been counterproductive. The OHR has been heavily involved in all
levels of Bosnian politics from the national parliament to municipal governments, passing
legislation and removing elected officials.161 Much like the overlord model drawn from Lebanon
under Syrian rule, Bosnia has had a moderate level of stability due to low levels of political
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violence, but very little possibility of major political reforms. Compared to Pax Syriana era
Lebanon, which also had a moderate level of stability, Bosnia has had slightly more political
violence, but also shows somewhat more potential for reform. The biggest success of the
international community and OHR as liberal intervention has been to keep other actors that may
seek to advance their own interests in Bosnia from doing so. They have limited the ability of
Serbia, Croatia, Russia, and Turkey from pursing political agendas in Bosnia. The role and
motivations of these states is of great concern as the OHR winds down its mandate and gradually
withdraws from the country.

The Statebuilding Project of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Dayton Peace Accords was a unique peace agreement in the sheer number of
international organizations it provided explicit roles for. The implementation of the Dayton
Accords required the international community to undertake a massive statebuilding project in
Bosnia, one unlike any previous project in the breadth of different actors. The most prominent of
these actors in the early years of implementation were NATO, which oversaw the
Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), which was in charge of Bosnia’s elections, and the Office of the High
Representative (OHR), headed at first by former Prime Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt. The OHR
was meant to be the coordinator of the implementation process and has played the most
important role in the implementation process. Dayton also provided the European Court of
Human Rights the role of overseeing Bosnia’s Constitutional Court and control of refugees and
displaced persons.162 Dayton gave oversight of the Bosnian Central Bank to the International
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Monetary Fund (IMF).163 In addition, the Council of Europe, UNESCO, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) run by the UN
were also given roles to play.164 These are only the organizations that were explicitly given roles
at Dayton; many others have also played roles since that time.
The sheer number of groups involved in implementation has meant that the process has
been incredibly decentralized and has lacked a central message. Each organization has its domain
and approach to statebuilding, which has led to squabbling over turf both between nongovernmental and state actors.165 This decentralization and lack of coordination between
implementing actors seriously hindered the initial implementation process.166 The OHR, which is
the only body that could have undertaken coordination and messaging, began the implementation
process with no staff, no office, and no money to rectify these problems.167 In a situation that was
incredibly time-sensitive, the delay in establishing the Office of the High Representative was
inexcusable. The uncoordinated opening year of the implementation effort reinforced the
message that the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been getting throughout the war: the
international community was incredibly incompetent and unwilling or unable to help them. This
message played right into the hands of and was duly exploited by nationalists who wished to
undermine the peace process. These nationalists included Radovan Karadzic, who was not only
still at large, but regularly appeared on Serb media due to another failure of implementation.168

163

Ibid.
Ibid.
165
Elizabeth M. Cousens and Charles K. Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords,
International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 15.
166
Ibid.
167
Richard C. Holbrooke, To End a War, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1998), 324.
168
Ibid, 339.
164

48

In 1997, the Office of the High Representative was given sweeping powers to introduce
legislation by fiat and to dismiss democratically elected politicians for going against Dayton or
corruption.169 The High Representative used these powers some 900 times between 1997 and
2010, a significant percentage coming during the term of Lord Paddy Ashdown as High
Representative.170 While it is true that progress was made during this time, it was made only by
using the Bonn Powers and has not created the impetus for future reforms. In fact, it has done the
opposite. Overuse of the Bonn Powers has allowed nationalist party leaders to garner support
with their constituents by railing against reforms that they know are necessary, since the OHR
will simply impose them, costing the politicians nothing.171 The cycle of dependency that has
arisen is troubling for Bosnia’s future.
The OHR, which was set up to implement Dayton, has routinely invoked the “spirit of
Dayton” in order to move beyond the provisions outlined in the text. Members of all three
nationalist parties have criticized the OHR for stepping beyond its authority and failing to respect
the ethnic autonomy provisions of the Dayton Accords.172 Especially in the first few years of
international implementation, little policy was actually developed by elected representatives
themselves either at the level of the central government or in the entities of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS).173 The heaviest foreign
interference was in the RS, but the US and OHR collaborated to write much of the Federation’s
policy as well. Any opposition to these policies has been construed as obstruction to the
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implementation of Dayton and has been sanctioned accordingly.174 Much of the opposition is
correctly identified as obstruction; however, the OHR in its response has utterly failed to
undermine support for obstructionist policy and politicians. In fact, it has most likely
strengthened its appeal.175
International statebuilding in BiH violated Bosnian sovereignty and self-governance,
especially in the first decade of implementation. The way the international community has gone
about the implementation process has been paternalistic and even neo-imperialistic. The rhetoric
coming from successive High Representatives and other leaders of international organizations
has regarded Bosnians as ‘not ready for democracy’ and Bosnia has continually been held to
higher standards than other nations in areas such as corruption and political disfunction.176 The
Office of the High Representative and OSCE especially have instead of decentralizing power in
the manner that Dayton calls for, recentralized it in the hands of their own organizations.177 The
international community has preferred top-down solutions to bottom-up and involves Bosnians
very little in its decision making.178 Furthermore, the decisions of the OHR are not subject to
judicial review or legislative veto, thus forcing through democratization measures by
undemocratic means.179 The international community has funneled money into cross-ethnic
political parties and opposition media sources. However, the result has been an overabundance of
these entities, such that their impact is severely diluted.180 None of them has found a core
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sustainable audience and thus have folded without international support. Efforts in this regard
have been counterproductive at best.
The international community has operated on the extremes with regard to elections as
well. They held elections to show the world an artificial benchmark of democratization and then
imposed legislation and basically ignored the authority of the officials that were elected. The
1996 elections are the best example of this. The OSCE on the ground wanted to show progress to
the US and the EU.181 Few people who had settled in a new locality after being internally
displaced or those who had sought refuge outside the country were able to register for the 1996
elections.182 The premature date resulted in voters being subjected to harassment and
intimidation at polling places and the election of the three nationalist parties that had overseen
the war.183 After the elections and after the Bonn powers were granted, the international actors
used the legitimacy of those elections to put in place policies that they wanted. David Chandler,
writing about municipal elections in Mostar, says: “The beauty of the externally-administered
electoral process was that the people living in Mostar could have an election in which the parties
supporting the international community received only marginal support yet could have their
policies implemented under the guise of ethnic equality and consensus politics. The elections
were considered a success not because of the results, but because they provided a mechanism for
enforcing the will of the international community.”184 The international community made
lemonade from the lemons of the 1996 election and the democratic rights of Bosnians were
squeezed.
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The Stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Much like Lebanon during the Pax Syriana, Bosnia’s stability has been a mixed bag. The
country has experienced low levels of political violence that have continued to decrease over
time. However, Bosnia has made very little progress on the myriad of issues that plague its
government. The most important of these is major constitutional reform that will be required if
the country is to join the EU. The Annex 4 Constitution from the Dayton Accords was only
meant to be temporary and yet it is still Bosnia’s constitution after almost 25 years.
Political violence in Bosnia has been characterized by heavily controlled, low-level
attacks meant not to disrupt the peace agreement, but to impede parts of the multicultural aspects
of its implementation. Bosnia only experienced 42 deaths from political violence in the first five
years after the Dayton.185 Most of these deaths came in the immediate aftermath of Dayton
before IFOR and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) had taken full control of security in
the country.186 Out of 199 instances of violence between 1995 and 1999, over 199 people were
wounded in addition to the 42 who were killed.187 24% of these attacks were classified as
reprisals188 and 39% as a pattern of attacks189.190
Two major factors kept political violence in Bosnia low in the first few years postDayton. The first of these is the presence of IFOR/SFOR and UNPT. These two bodies have
been remarkably successful. Neither IFOR, not SFOR suffered a single casualty in Bosnia. In the
first two years of implementation, there were attacks aimed at IFOR and SFOR in order to test
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the resolve of the force. These included periodic shootings at helicopters that forced landings and
grenade attacks at NATO vehicles.191 Up until July 1996, Bosnian Serb leaders were threatening
to shoot down NATO helicopters.192 There were also attacks in Sarajevo and Mostar including
sniper fire at streetcars and NATO troops and mortar attacks.193 These types of attacks ceased by
1997, but rock-throwing at NATO buses and convoys escorting minorities continued until at
least 2002.194
The second factor is that the major political parties kept control of their military and
police forces after the Dayton Agreement was signed. The majority Bosniak Party of
Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-BiH), and the Serbian
Democratic Party (SDS) have kept control over even demobilized soldiers through pensions,
disability benefits, tax breaks, and veterans’ organizations.195 The interests of these parties are
geared towards not undermining the agreement while impeding the implementation of the
multicultural provisions of it, as the agreement provides significant clientelist opportunities for
them to give followers and cronies positions of political and economic power.196 Thus, deadly
political violence has been kept to a minimum while other forms of political violence plagued
Bosnia in the early years of implementation. While the tight control of political violence by
political parties kept deaths low and managed violence, it has negative effects upon Bosnia’s
level of stability.
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Non-deadly political violence such as recurring riots aimed at minority returns, clear and
regular patterns of assault and arson, and harassment of minority returnees were rampant in
Bosnia from in the latter half of the 1990s. There is reasonable evidence for Bosnian political
parties being behind this type of violence in order to undermine implementation, especially the
starting of riots.197 From 1995 to 1997, there were 1191 assaults, 986 incidents of harassment,
138 incidents of the interruption of free movement, 1060 explosions, 78 instances of sniper fire,
396 acts of arson, and 4675 evictions.198 These acts of political violence were almost evenly split
between the Republika Srpska and the Federation.199 In the city of Doboj, over 1000 Serbs
charged NATO troops who were escorting Bosniaks back to their homes. The mayor of Doboj is
highly suspected of organizing the riot as local radio stations played Serb leaders calling on
people to prevent Muslims from entering the city.200 In another attack, a violent mob of 250
Serbs attacked a convoy of women in Prijedor visiting a former detention center. This attack was
orchestrated by the Bosnian Serb leadership.201
The single greatest example of political violence was in the largely Serb eastern suburbs
of Sarajevo. Shortly after Dayton, Bosnian Serb media began instructing Serbs in Sarajevo to
burn their apartments and leave the city as the Serb section of the city was handed back to the
Federation. Thugs and gangs began to harass Serbs into leaving the city. IFOR stayed in its
barracks, not even sending its firefighting equipment as the Serb section of Sarajevo burned and
people were forced from their homes.202 All of this was captured by international media and
played into the same narrative of helplessness and a toothless international force that would not
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protect Bosnian citizens. This was the single largest blow to implementation efforts seen in
Bosnia. The resulting anger and distrust of the implementing actors in addition to the
continuation of violence between ethnic groups were blows to the reconciliation process and
further entrenched ordinary people in their hatred of the other ethnic groups.
The vast majority of political violence has been directed at minorities who return to
ethnic enclaves. These attacks can sometimes spark cycles of reprisals. In April 1998, Croat
extremists shot and killed two elderly Serbs and burned their houses to the ground. In response,
hundreds of Serbs blocked Croats from entering Sunday mass. Afterwards 1500 Croats attacked
the municipal offices, beat the mayor nearly to death, and assaulted IPTF staff.203 In August
1997, 700 families in the city of Jajce were threatened by mobs and expelled in a single
weekend.204 In Mostar, there were over 70 attacks on Bosniak refugees in one year, ranging from
confrontation by mobs to rockets fired into or near homes.205 Including non-violent attacks, such
as verbal harassment, there were 358 attacks on minorities between 2000 and 2002.206 There
were 277 in 2003, only 38 of which were violent, and 135 in 2004.207
Dayton’s Annex 4 Constitution was intended as a temporary document. At some point in
the future, Bosnia will come to the point that it requires a new one. At that time, all of the
peoples of the country will have to come together and hammer out the most existential issues of
the state. It is my supreme hope that this can be done without it descending into violence, but in
any case, the international community should not play a role in this. The international
community has not been able to decide what future it sees for Bosnia and the last thing Bosnians
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need in making the difficult sacrifices necessary for a new constitution is a muddled and
confusing international insertion or worse different states aligning with domestic factions.208 This
is a decision that Bosnians must make among themselves, first through their representatives and
then by a direct vote of the Bosnian people.
Between 2005 and 2006 there was a brief window of opportunity for meaningful political
reforms in Bosnia. In response to a growing desire for EU accession, Bosnia’s legislature asked
for a report on its status with regards to joining the EU. The Venice Commission report laid out
where Bosnia falls short in its political system and gives recommendations for ways to solve
those issues. The biggest concern was the weakness of the Bosnian central government vis-à-vis
the power of the RS and the Federation and its capacity and authority to enforce EU law.209 It
recommended reducing the power of the Vital National Interest veto210. The Venice Commission
also recommended eliminating the House of Peoples, which is Bosnia’s equivalent of the US
Senate and move its tripartite presidency to a single indirectly elected president with power
centralized in a council of ministers.211 It raised concerns over Bosnia’s lack of national identity
and argued that the composition and method of Bosnia’s elections would be inconsistent with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.212
In response, a working group was convened of all of Bosnia’s political parties and led by
a former deputy OHR. Over the course of a year, the working group settled on a package of
reforms that was significantly different from those the Venice Commission recommended, but
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would have brought Bosnia into to line with EU standards.213 However, the majority Bosniak
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH), concerned about upcoming elections dropped its
support of the package at the last moment and it failed to meet the 2/3 majority required for
constitutional change by a vote of 26-16.214 The reform package has not been brought back up
for discussion since it failed in 2006.

Two Paths for Bosnia
Bosnia is very much at a crossroads for its future. The international community is in the
process of backing away from its strong role in Bosnian statebuilding, while transitioning many
of its responsibilities to the European Union. One path for Bosnia is all about gaining EU
membership. The EU continues to work with Bosnia on political reforms in a way similar to
other EU candidate states. This path is buoyed by the rise of some cross-confessional grassroots
organizing over the past several years. At the same time, the diminishing role of the international
community and the OHR in particular has allowed for the reengagement of other regional and
world powers, namely, Serbia, Croatia, Turkey, and Russia. There is a strong possibility that
international engagement shifts more towards a proxy model in the coming years with Serbia,
Croatia, and Turkey each vying to advance nationalistic interests at the expense of Bosnian
stability. In addition, increasing Russian influence in Bosnia at a time of increasing Russian
assertiveness across Eastern Europe is worrying due to the possibility of the addition of a layer of
struggle for global hegemony between the United States and Russia on top of a struggle for
regional hegemony. This would resemble the dynamics currently ongoing in Syria, where the US
and Russia are competing for global hegemony on top of a struggle for regional hegemony
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between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is impossible to predict which of these scenarios will play out
in Bosnia in the coming years, but the former will certainly be much more favorable for Bosnian
stability.
In recent years, the role of the OHR has declined. In 2008 and several times since, there
has been discussion in the international community around closing the OHR and transferring
some of the responsibilities to the EU Special Representative. This is in line with the EU’s
growing role in Bosnia as the country seeks accession to the bloc. In 2004, the European Union
Force (EUFOR) replaced SFOR as the military implementing actor in Bosnia. The force now
comprises only about 600 troops from 17 different EU nations and has a much smaller role.
Bosnia has seen some cross-confessional grassroots organizing in the last five years,
which is promising for the country. Because of a stalemate between political forces over
identification numbers leading to the suspension of new passports, a baby in the RS died due to
not being able to cross into Serbia for surgery.215 This prompted mass protests in Bosnia, called
the “baby revolution” with parents of all ethnic groups surrounding the parliament building and
linked arms, symbolically trapping the deputies inside until they could break the impasse.216
There have been multiple other protests over the condition of the economy and political
disfunction in the last five years. In addition, over the objections of school leaders and
politicians, students at Bosnia’s “two schools under one roof” system of schools are objecting to
the strict division between ethnic groups. Students are meeting students from the other side at
cafes after school in the face of discouragement from teachers and administrators.217 Students

Gordy, “Dayton’s Annex 4 Constitution at 20,” 618.
Ibid.
217
Barbara Surk, “In a Divided Bosnia, Segregated Schools Persist,” The New York Times, December 2, 2018, sec.
World, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/01/world/europe/bosnia-schools-segregated-ethnic.html.
215
216

58

have also protested the segregation of already integrated schools in the city of Jajce.218 Younger
politicians are also speaking out against the policy, which has allowed for ethnically biased
history to be taught under the guise of protecting the culture of each ethnic group.219
However, at the same time, as the US and Europe have paid less attention to Bosnia and
moved towards other priorities,220 not only have Serbia and Croatia reentered Bosnian politics,
but Russia and Turkey have also increased their influence in Bosnia. At a time where Turkish
campaign events are banned from much of Europe, Turkey’s ruling party, the AKP, has found a
sister party in the main Bosniak party, the SDA. This is despite Turkish arrogance and
patronizing attitude towards Bosnian Muslims. When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
held a rally in Sarajevo ahead of the last Turkish elections, the Turks handled security and it was
reported that the Bosnian government only found out about the event when Erdogan announced
it to the public.221 Furthermore, there is a sense among Bosnians that Turks have romantic
notions of Ottoman Bosnia and pay no attention to Bosnian language, culture, and traditions.222
Bosnians repeat stories of Turkish students not wanting to learn the language and there has been
a rise in Turkish Muslim traditions in Bosnia. Bosnians feel that Turks see them only as
Ottomans with no culture of their own. Turkey has asserted itself as the defender of Bosnian
Muslims and uses this as a nationalist element to protect Muslims in Europe, especially within
former Ottoman territories.223 Turkey also controls almost all of Bosnia’s Islamic media and has
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made an impact on Bosnian media more generally, but its influence is largely limited to areas
with significant Bosniak populations.224
Russia has heavily invested in its relationship with the Republika Srpska government in
Banja Luka. It has also been accused of training nationalist Serb paramilitary groups made up of
veterans of the Bosnian War, who have also begun fighting on the Russian side in Eastern
Ukraine.225 This is in addition to its formal military support for the RS, which has included antiaircraft missiles that are meant to be mounted on helicopters.226 Russia along with Serbia has
also supplied the RS police with 4000 automatic rifles.227 This is only the official number, but
more may have not been reported. In addition, the Russian Ministry of the Interior and the
Moscow Police have entered into a contract to train the RS Police.228 As with much of the rest of
Eastern Europe, Russia’s aim has been to halt increases in the size of both NATO and the EU.
Russia has stepped up its financial support to the RS as well in recent years and has made inroads
with Bosnian Croats as well. Russian foreign investment in Bosnia doubled between 2008 and
2016.229 Furthermore, Russia is Bosnia’s sole gas supplier and Russian firms control all of
Bosnia’s oil refineries.230 The Russian state oil company Gazprom, through subsidiaries, owns
Bosnia’s sole port and its largest aluminum processor located in Mostar.231 Russia has used its
economic interests in Croat areas of Bosnia to strengthen their relationship on political issues
with Croatia.
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The EU’s retreat has made Croatia in particular more bullish in interfering in Bosnian
politics. The dominant Bosnian Croat Party the HDZ is closely linked to the largest party in
Croatia of the same name. In the last election for the Croat member of Bosnia’s tripartite
presidency, the HDZ’s candidate Dragan Covic lost, which prompted the Croatian parliament to
take up debate on a resolution declaring the election to be illegitimate due to the fact that
Bosniaks can vote in the Croat presidential elections.232 This move was condemned by the OHR
and the Bosniak parties as well as the international community as a violation of Bosnian
sovereignty.233
The RS and its president Milorad Dodik have threatened to hold a referendum on
secession from Bosnia several times in the last few years. This is seen as the most probable
catalyst for a return to civil war, as Bosniaks would never allow the RS to declare independence
and would prevent it by force of arms.234 However, the likelihood that an independent RS would
be functional is extremely unlikely. The Serbians are not likely to absorb the RS or even
recognize it as an independent state due to its bid for EU membership and the complications it
would cause for Serbia in Kosovo.235 If Serbia did not recognize the RS’ independence, it is
likely that no other state would due to extreme Western opposition and the international norm
against unilateral declarations of independence. Furthermore, the sanctions that the US and EU
would levy upon the RS would cripple it economically, putting even more doubt on its
sustainability as a sovereign state.236 However, the lack of viability for an independent RS does
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not preclude the possibility of a very bloody and savage war that would undue all of the slow
progress made towards repairing the wounds of the civil war.237
Only time will tell which path Bosnia will embark on. Despite its risks, Bosnia’s path to
the EU would result in much higher stability even than it currently possesses. As such, the EU
should continue to encourage Bosnia to continue along this path, for if that door closes or Bosnia
feels that EU accession is unachievable, the consequences could be truly catastrophic. A return to
civil warfare in Bosnia, this time with even more international involvement and proxy warfare
than the first time would result in a conflict resembling that in Syria, which has raged for eight
years and has seen unspeakable violence. Renewed conflict in Bosnia is certainly not in the
interest of the European Union, which is still dealing with the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis.
The prevention of another one is fully in the EU’s hands.
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Chapter 4: The Unified Front Model
Introduction
The engagement of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland towards conflict in
Northern Ireland has resulted in the most stable post-conflict state studied in this project. The
British and Irish governments put pressure on the unionist and nationalist parties respectively
and spoke with one voice when it came to public statements about Northern Ireland.238 Britain
and Ireland settled their differences and disagreements behind closed doors, never letting
disputes come to the public’s attention.239 They have put forward a unified front towards
Northern Ireland. The efforts of the two governments have almost entirely been focused on
fostering unity and governance. The UK has not sought to empower the Protestant majority, even
when Northern Ireland has been under home rule. Ireland, for its part, has not pushed a
nationalist agenda of unification. For the most part, both sides have been incredibly careful not to
jeopardize the peace.
These efforts have led to a low level of political violence and an environment where acts
of political violence, when they do happen, have unified rather than divided Northern Irish
society. In addition, as the direct result of British and Irish pressure, major political reforms have
been enacted. Furthermore, in contrast to reforms passed by fiat in Bosnia by the OHR, reforms
in Northern Ireland have been sustainable and due to pressure applied by an allied state, have
resulted in little backlash against international actors. The revision of the Good Friday
Agreement agreed at St. Andrews and the entrance into government of the DUP and Sinn Fein
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was a feat thought impossible by many observers. Much still remains to be done in order for the
reality of full-time functioning government to exist, but significant progress has been made and
all parties have bought into the reforms.
However, Brexit has been incredibly destabilizing to Northern Ireland, as it is an issue of
territory and identity, themes that were at the core of the Troubles and had been suppressed since
the Good Friday Agreement. Furthermore, Brexit has placed the UK and Ireland in an adversarial
relationship, on opposite sides of the negotiations over Britain’s leaving of the EU.240 Thus, not
only has open cooperation on Northern Ireland become almost non-existent, Brexit has publicly
divided Britain and Ireland over Brexit policy towards Northern Ireland, undermining the unified
front and everything that made it so successful.241

The UK and Ireland’s United Front
Britain and Ireland’s abandoning of their individual political projects towards Northern
Ireland is rooted in the Good Friday Agreement itself and even before that in the Anglo-Irish
Agreement of 1985. Before this point, Britain had pursued a policy of empowering the Protestant
majority, which severely discriminated against the Catholic minority, while the Irish government
actively pursued a policy of Irish unification. These two political projects actively fueled the
conflict. A major plank of the Good Friday Agreement was that the two states would abandon
their political projects and allow Northern Ireland to decide whenever it chose whether it would
remain in the United Kingdom or rejoin with the rest of the island of Ireland.242 The Republic of
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Ireland for its part, agreed to change its constitution, removing language centered around a
unified Ireland.243
From 1985 onward, the British and Irish governments spoke with one voice in public and
settled their policy differences behind closed doors.244 In addition, the British and Irish
governments strove to not make Northern Ireland policy a domestic political football and thus
when government changed hands, Northern Ireland policy remained relatively continuous.245 All
parties agreed that the peace process was far too important to jeopardize with interparty
squabbling. This allowed the governments to focus on the peace process without worrying about
its domestic political ramifications. In the negotiations for the Good Friday Agreement in 1998
and the St. Andrews Agreement in 2006, the British and Irish governments put significant
pressure on unionist and nationalist parties respectively to make a deal, threatening drastic
consequences for the party that was seen to be intransigent.246 After the Good Friday Agreement,
the British and Irish governments were heavily involved in agreements on a number of issues
regarding implementation, including the number of departments in the power-sharing executive
and the responsibilities of the cross-border implementation bodies.247 John Darby and Roger Mac
Ginty argue “the main motors determining the pace, direction, and outcome of the peace process
were located in Britain and Ireland.”248
Before the Brexit referendum, Britain only took unilateral action towards Northern
Ireland and put its own domestic concerns above the peace during Stormontgate in October
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2002. The incident took place when police in Northern Ireland raided Sinn Fein offices and
leaders. It was alleged that republicans in the Northern Irish Legislative Assembly at Stormont
were spying on the British and Irish governments.249 Details of what exactly the decision-making
process behind the raid was are still murky with multiple allegations of interference by members
of the British civil service in Northern Ireland who were opposed to Sinn Fein in government
played a strong role.250 The UK realized that it had jeopardized the peace and the charges against
those arrested in the raid were eventually dropped in 2005 to avoid further endangering it.251
Nevertheless, the result was the suspension of devolved government, which would not return
until 2007 when the St. Andrew’s Agreement came into force.
Even when devolved government failed and direct rule by the UK was reinstated in
Northern Ireland, the UK has not interfered in the minutia of Northern Irish politics and society.
Westminster has essentially acted as a caretaker government, not overstepping its bounds to
become involved in issues it does not have a democratic mandate for. Direct rule has largely
been limited to the most basic of government functions, mainly the passing of budgets.252 Neither
the UK nor the Republic of Ireland has shown any desire to use their roles to enact any widescale changes without involving the domestic parties.

Northern Irish Stability
Political violence has steadily and significantly dropped since the Good Friday
Agreement was signed. The largest attack was the Omagh bombing in August 1998, only a few
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months after the Agreement was signed, which killed 29 people. It is also the only act of political
violence to kill multiple people since the Agreement.253 Intracommunal killings are much more
prevalent than intercommunal killings; every loyalist paramilitary killed from 1998 to 2017 was
killed by another loyalist paramilitary.254 In addition, deaths of security personnel are down from
27.8% of all deaths by political violence to 5.5%.255 Northern Ireland’s overall crime rates have
dropped to 40% of what they were in 1998 and now it has a lower crime rate than England or
Scotland in all categories.256 Murders dropped to their lowest ever levels in 2016/2017.257
Political violence from attacks on symbolic buildings to political shootings and deaths from
political violence have dropped over the past few years.258 Furthermore, parades, which were a
major source of violence during the Troubles, have become less so in recent years. The Parades
Commission, which oversees all parades in Northern Ireland and places restrictions on them if
necessary, has seen a stark drop in the number of parades deemed “sensitive” and has applied far
fewer restrictions recently.259
However, both loyalist and republican armed groups still exist and have an interest in
undermining the peace. Most of the loyalist militias that have not disbanded have become
essentially gangs and are internally fractured.260 However, a return to violence between
nationalists and republicans could unify them and provide an already established staging ground.
In addition, low level violence with a sectarian bent is still a common occurrence in segregated
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working-class areas in Northern Ireland.261 Youth unemployment is these areas is 15% for
Catholics and 24% for Protestants.262 Dissidents have perpetrated a recorded 711 violent
incidents between 1997 and 2010.263 This violence has trended downward over that period, but
roughly 50-80 attacks per year still occur.264 Violence is often directed at schools, churches,
orange halls, Gaelic Sport Association buildings, and centers around parades, soccer matches,
Halloween, bonfires, and Gaelic marches.265 High unemployment, glorification of the Troubles,
segregated housing, and sectarian organizations lay the groundwork for violence.266
While no major party in Northern Ireland and neither Britain nor the Republic of Ireland
have any interest in a return to violence, both the DUP and Sinn Fein carefully balance
promotion of British and Irish national identity respectively with a commitment to non-violence,
something that can be incredibly difficult to do especially in times of tension.267 Mismanagement
of this balance occurred in 2012 where an agreement brokered by the Alliance Party to have
Belfast City Hall fly the Union Jack during five specified days per year, erupted into violence
when the DUP sent out mailers condemning the deal in an effort to win back an East Belfast
Legislative Assembly seat lost to the Alliance Party in the last election.268 The violence resulted
in hundreds of injuries to police officers, death threats against politicians, and the burning down
of an Alliance Party office.269
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However, a highly positive sign for Northern Ireland’s stability is that acts of political
violence have inspired strong condemnation by all political parties and unity among Catholics
and Protestants. Since the Provisional IRA’s dissolution in 2005, political violence in Northern
Ireland has not even had tangential ties to political parties. The Omagh bombing brought strong
condemnation by all political parties, including Sinn Fein, which was the first time that this had
happened.270 Riots in Derry271 in 2018 brought strong condemnation by all five main political
parties, including strong language from Sinn Fein head Mary Lou McDonald, who called the
dissident members of the New IRA272 “warped, negative, regressive, dangerous people.”273 Even
more encouraging was the attendance of the children of former Deputy First Minister and
Provisional IRA leader Martin McGuiness at an anti-violence rally entitled “Not in our
Name.”274
Pressure by the British and Irish governments has led to significant political reform in
Northern Ireland. After “Stormontgate” ended the power-sharing executive in 2003, the British
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Hain and the Irish Justice Minister put strong
pressure on the DUP and Sinn Fein respectively to make a deal that would herald the return of
the body.275 This pressure in part led to the Provisional IRA declaring its armed campaign over
in July of 2005.276 There is some evidence that unlike Hizballah following Israeli withdrawal
from Southern Lebanon, the IRA was concerned about the sharp turn against terrorism in the US
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following 9-11 and that this also impacted their decision to end their campaign.277 It also led to
the St. Andrew’s Agreement, which slightly amended the Good Friday Agreement, removing the
power of the UK to suspend devolved government and setting a timetable for devolved policing
and criminal justice for 2008. Most importantly, it led to the DUP and Sinn Fein heading the
power-sharing executive as the two largest parties in Northern Ireland for the first time. The two
hardline unionist and nationalist parties, which had moderated over time, joined a government
together, something that couldn’t have been comprehended even five years earlier.278

Brexit’s Effect on Northern Ireland’s Stability and the Unified Front Model
British-Irish cooperation and focus were beginning to wain even before the Brexit
referendum. The 2008 financial crash and European debt crisis left the Republic of Ireland
financially beholden to the EU as it was in danger of defaulting on its debts and more dependent
on the UK as its largest trading partner.279 This meant that the Republic had little appetite for
pushing the UK on Northern Ireland and impasses having to do with British austerity measures
that hurt Northern Ireland’s large state sector especially hard.280 Over this period, Britain and
Ireland focused on economic ties and paid less attention to Northern Ireland, a shift spurred by a
change in British Conservative Party policy with the election of David Cameron as Prime
Minister, which saw the British government leave Northern Ireland to fix its own problems
without outside involvement.281 The UK played a role in convening talks to work through
Northern Irish political impasses in the 2010s, but did not participate in them.282 At the same
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time, the Republic of Ireland stepped up efforts to mediate conflict through its Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, but did not send high level government officials.283
The Brexit referendum itself saw little attention paid by either the Remain or Leave
camps towards the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement. The
Leave campaign in particular, ignored concerns over where the border would be, arguing little
would change, even as they argued everything would change with the rest of the EU.284 The
impact on Northern Ireland was treated as a non-issue or an Irish285 issue during the campaign.286
The Brexit referendum largely mapped onto unionist-nationalist divides in Northern Ireland.287
The DUP was supportive of the Leave campaign, while Sinn Fein and the SDLP supported
Remain. The UUP was the only party to cross the divide, supporting Remain by arguing it would
strengthen the UK.288 Although Northern Ireland as a whole voted Remain, the vote also
reflected the identity divide with significant majorities of both unionists and loyalists voting
Leave and Remain respectively. Immediately following the result, Sinn Fein argued for a
referendum on uniting Ireland, again showing how Brexit moved constitutional issues back to the
forefront.289 In addition, turnout in Northern Ireland was ten percentage points lower than the rest
of the UK, demonstrating that even in Northern Ireland the campaigns and the associated
political parties did not do a good job of convincing voters of its importance.290 Furthermore,
Theresa May’s government did not consult with the Northern Irish government or any of the
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other devolved governments of the UK before triggering the process for the UK to formally.
leave the European Union.
Brexit raises issues of territory and identity and places those issues over existing fissures
in Northern Ireland that had been diminishing in importance since the Good Friday Agreement.
Because both the UK and Ireland were in the EU, the border between Northern Ireland and the
Republic could be reduced to the softest of soft borders. It allowed for 30,000 people to cross the
border for school or work daily and 1.8 million cars to cross it every month.291 It also allowed for
the mass flow of trade between the two countries, including Irish trucking headed for the EU
through the UK. Brexit throws this into chaos and undermines the core issues that the Good
Friday Agreement resolved. Brexit puts both Northern Ireland’s position within the UK under
threat for unionists and its position within Ireland under threat for nationalists. This existential
threat to territory and identity is what drove the violence of the Troubles. Any type of border
checks between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is a red line for nationalists and any
type of border checks between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK is a red line for
unionists.292 Such is the debacle that Brexit poses for Northern Ireland.
Furthermore, Brexit’s identity debate about being British or European, escalates the
British-Irish identity debate in Northern Ireland between unionists and nationalists. This debate
had been diminishing in importance as the DUP and Sinn Fein moderated in the early 2000s.
This shift was caused largely by the two parties needing to have party platforms that went
beyond constitutional and cultural issues to include economic and social issues that any political
party in government must contend with.293 These issues don’t easily map out onto existing
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cultural lines. Thus, the DUP and Sinn Fein could no longer risk alienating voters who were
concerned with education or economics or any of the other myriad issues that needed to be
addressed.
Brexit has had serious ramifications for British-Irish relations. It put the two countries on
adversarial footing for the first time since the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. It has broken the
taboo against criticizing the other in public over Northern Ireland.294 Britain has also begun to
back away from the British-Irish Council created by the Good Friday Agreement. No British
Prime Minister has visited since Tony Blair and its last meeting was in September of 2016.295
Brexit negotiations have meant that the British and Irish Prime Ministers have not been meeting
or issuing joint statements.296 Failing a joint strategy for Brexit from Britain and Ireland, the two
governments have looked to the Northern Irish devolved government, whose executive has been
dissolved since January 2017, for a unified Brexit strategy, something that is highly unlikely. 297
The parties remain highly divided over Brexit issues as discussed above, and have not seriously
planned for the economic effects of Brexit upon Northern Ireland.298 Furthermore, after the snap
elections in 2017, the DUP is now part of Theresa May’s government, making the ruling
Conservative Party somewhat beholden to the unionist position in any conflict that arises in
Northern Ireland.299
Brexit throws the ability of Britain and Ireland to broker a political compromise and
ensure the cessation of violence into jeopardy. There is a real possibility of two nightmare
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scenarios. The first involves a rise in cultural and territorial anxieties over Brexit, followed by
some sort of spark that ignites violent conflict. In this scenario, the British-Irish relationship is so
strained by Brexit and constrained by other factors that the two governments are unable to exert
the necessary coordinated pressure to put the lid back on. The second is that relations between
the UK and Ireland become so strained over Brexit and the implementation of any deal,
including a no deal Brexit, that the two states’ interactions with Northern Ireland shift towards a
proxy model, with each actively putting its own interests and those of its proxy group above
peace and stability on their borders. These are the pathways for a return to the violence of the
height of the Troubles. At that point all bets are off for what happens next, but the Good Friday
Agreement will go up in smoke after 20 relatively successful years and many more people will
needlessly die.
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Conclusion
This project set out to expand the study of post-conflict states beyond the success of
peace agreements to examine the stability of those states decades in the future. When expanding
the range of study in this way, the role of international engagement widens beyond providing of
security guarantees or enforcement of a peace agreement. It also goes beyond constructive
actions towards post-conflict states to include destructive ones as well. This project has shown
that the way in which international actors engage with post-conflict states over a period of a
decade-plus has a significant impact on the stability of those states through political violence and
possibility of major political reforms.
Lebanon under the overlord model saw Syria occupy the country and use it to achieve its
own political interests. Syria used its power and influence to create division between and within
political factions to ensure that none of them became powerful enough to challenge Syrian
hegemony. It backed this up with exhaustive interference in every facet of Lebanese politics and
society, interfering in elections, approving legislation, and placing agents in civil society
organizations. These efforts had a moderate effect on stability. Political violence in this period of
Lebanese history was closely tied to the amount of control Syria had over the country. Violence
was high as Syria established its control in the first two years post-conflict, followed by a period
of low violence in the period of total Syrian control in the mid to late 1990s, and high violence
again as Syria began losing control in the early 2000s. However, the possibility of major political
reform, though desired by most, if not all, Lebanese political parties was impossible during this
period due to Syria’s approval of the status quo and control over legislation.
The division and distrust that Syria fostered during the Pax Syriana has had a direct
impact on the struggles Lebanon has faced since Syrian withdrawal in 2005. The building blocks
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of fierce oppositional political and gridlock were placed by Syrian control. During the Pax
Syriana, major disagreements were ended by leaders of all feuding parties being summoned to
Damascus. This served Syria’s interests because renewed civil conflict resulting from political
disagreement would invite other foreign actors into Lebanon and obliterate the control Syria had
over the country. This mediation also allowed Syria to both demonstrate their power and appear
diplomatic at the same time. It served the narrative that the weak political parties needed Syria to
solve their disputes and thus legitimized Syrian presence. This process made even the highest
executive leaders of the Lebanese state subservient to the Syrian president. Thus, when this
mechanism went away following Syrian withdrawal, each faction turned to its own outside actor,
the Future Movement and March 14 Alliance to Saudi Arabia and Hizballah and March 8
Alliance to Iran. This new mechanism allowed regional rivals to engage in this rivalry over
Lebanese politics.
The proxy model saw Saudi Arabia and Iran emerge to fill the vacuum of Syrian
withdrawal and enact their regional rivalry through Lebanese proxies. These actors and states
with similar interests such as Israel and Syria undertook major destabilizing actions in Lebanon
in order to protect their own interests or counter the influence of the rival faction. These states
have continuously put their own interests and regional rivalry above Lebanese stability.
However, Saudi Arabia and Iran stayed away from the invasive interference that Syria previously
exhibited. There has been no direct interference in Lebanese elections, though the two states
have poured massive sums into supporting aligned parties and candidates. This has had a
profound negative effect upon Lebanese stability. Political violence has risen dramatically, as
militias, a force unseen since the civil war, have begun to re-form. Assassinations and bombings
have risen and both Beirut and Tripoli have seen street battles in the last decade. All of this has

76

put major political reform out of the question with the holding of elections and government
formation taking all of Lebanon’s political capital.
Lebanon’s future is heavily in doubt. The country has managed to survive for nearly 15
years since Syrian withdrawal without return to civil war. However, the rising level of political
violence and return of many of the dynamics that surrounded the civil war are worrying for
Lebanon’s future. The country is certainly a victim of neighborhood effect, with the Syrian Civil
War raging right next door and ongoing instability across the region certainly having a
significant impact on Lebanon. It will not be able to escape its cycle of instability as long as
these conflicts are still ongoing and regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran remains
unresolved. High levels of political violence and unbreakable political gridlock will continue into
at least the near future.
The liberal intervention model in Bosnia saw the Office of the High Representative,
backed by the international community and alongside several multinational organizations, de
facto take over the country. The international community’s goal was to embark on a massive
statebuilding project and arrive at a government that would be stable, democratic, and be free
from ethnic animosities at a structural and political level. However, it has largely failed in that
goal, mainly due to the international community’s heavy interference in the process, from the
Bonn Powers, which allow the OHR to pass legislation and dismiss elected officials, to mass
interference in Bosnian elections and the funding of many competing cross-communal political
parties, none of which have gained a foothold in the country. This interference has allowed
Bosnia’s three main ethnically oriented political parties to drag their heels and blame the OHR
and international community for every law passed in order to satisfy their nationalist bases. As
such, Bosnia has had a moderate level of stability. Political violence has been low, but it has
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largely been organized by political parties at the local level to intimidate and attack minorities.
The possibility of major political reform has largely been low as well, with a brief period in the
mid-2000s where there was some movement.
Bosnia is at a crossroads. The country can continue to work towards EU membership, a
prospect that seems to be riskier and more fleeting by the week, but if achieved would provide
meaningful benefits for the country. The other option is to abandon EU accession. This option
likely shifts the model from liberal intervention to one of proxy, both on a regional and global
level. Croatia, Serbia, and Turkey all have interests in supporting ethnically aligned communities
in Bosnia and could attempt to assert more dominance there. At the same time, Bosnia could
become another site of US-Russian proxy rivalry as each try to assert dominance globally. In this
case, the possibility of renewed warfare dramatically rises, particularly if the Republika Srpska
attempts to secede. Bosnia currently holds many similarities to Lebanon in the early 2000s,
something that is worrying for the country’s future.
The case of Northern Ireland, marked by the unified front model, has been the most
successful post-conflict state studied here. The UK and the Republic of Ireland have worked
together, ensuring, with few exceptions, that the peace and stability of Northern Ireland is put
above all other interests. The two countries have worked with one voice in public, while
independently putting pressure on aligned Northern Irish factions to make compromises with the
other group. In this way, the UK and Ireland have broken through the deadlock, most notably
with the St. Andrews Agreement. Even when the Northern Irish Executive has collapsed and
home rule has returned, the UK did not interfere in Northern Irish domestic politics, simply
passing budgets and ensuring that government functions continue. This has led to a high level of
stability in Northern Ireland. Political violence has been low and has continued to drop over the
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15+ years since the Troubles ended. Furthermore, the few major acts of political violence have
been condemned in the strongest terms by all political parties and not used to score political
points. This is far from the politically controlled violence of Bosnia and violence by political
party affiliated militias and international actors in Lebanon. Northern Ireland has also shown the
highest possibility of political reform of any of the three cases, with the St. Andrews Agreement
and the joining of the DUP and Sinn Fein in government being the shining example.
Brexit has thrown Northern Ireland into a period of instability that threatens the
continuation of the unified front model. Brexit negotiations have pitted the UK and Ireland on
opposing sides of an issue that has massive implications for Northern Ireland. As such, public
cooperation between the two countries has almost entirely diminished including through the
institutions set up by the Good Friday Agreement. The Northern Irish Executive has fallen apart
and neither country has the political capital or political will to do the type of work that it has
taken to restore it. As such, Northern Ireland has been largely unable to prepare for the effects of
Brexit, should a deal be agreed or if one is not. Brexit has also placed the domestic interests of
both the UK and Ireland above the peace and stability of Northern Ireland. In addition, the
identity and territorial questions that Brexit raises closely map onto the issues at the heart of the
Northern Irish conflict. These issues had diminished in importance since 2000 and real progress
was being made on broadening the range of political issues of importance to Northern Irish
political parties.
There are two possibilities for a return to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The first
possibility is that a no-deal Brexit, which is looking more and more likely, throws both the UK
and Northern Ireland into chaos. This in turn causes an increase in animosity between Northern
Irish political parties, such that a spark, like an act of mass political violence brings a return to
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the politics of the Troubles and a further increase in violence. Relations between the UK and
Ireland are so damaged by Brexit that they are unable to recreate the same dynamic of
cooperation that they had previously with any legitimacy. The UK is further hamstrung by the
DUP’s inclusion in Theresa May’s government and is unable to wield enough leverage to get the
unionists to return to government and end the violence. The second possibility is a shift to a
proxy model state of engagement in Northern Ireland, with each state fully backing its respective
faction in rivalry with the opposing one. However, I do not believe either of these scenarios to be
particularly likely, even in the chaos of Brexit. The work that Northern Irish political parties
have done to condemn violence and work against it will not go away overnight. There is enough
resistance to further civil conflict in Northern Ireland to prevent a future outbreak of the kind of
violence seen in the Troubles.
This project marks the beginning of an examination of the phenomenon of international
engagement in post-conflict states. As such, there are significant opportunities for expansion of
this research. I welcome scholars who choose to take up this research question and either add to
or modify the models presented in this project through analysis of different cases to prove the
generalizability of the models. These models could also be applied to cases of interstate warfare
and beyond the regions and time period studied in this project. This research also leaves itself
open to a large-n statistical study of this phenomenon. It is my hope that this project has
established sufficient correlation between international engagement and post-conflict stability
that scholars find it worth engaging with these models and expanding upon them through their
own research.
Throughout researching this project, a fundamental question has been on my mind: when
does a post-conflict state cease to be a post-conflict state? The answer to this question has
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profound domestic and international implications. If a state is treated as a normal state, both
internally and internationally, political gridlock and increased tensions, which all states
experience from time to time, do not cause panic and overreaction. In post-conflict states, the
same events can cause renewed outbreaks of violence and scrambling of international actors in
ways that can accelerate rather than assuaging tensions, sending the country closer to renewed
outbreak of civil warfare. The process of post-conflict normalization is a phenomenon not
studied in the scholarly literature, despite its profound importance. I welcome scholars to take up
this question.
Worryingly, from the case studies in this project, shifts in the model of international
engagement seem to move in one direction: towards the proxy model. Lebanon officially shifted
with the Cedar Revolution and Bosnia and Northern Ireland both show signs of drift towards that
model. This shift reflects a reality of contemporary international relations, in contrast to the
world in the 1990s. We are in the middle of a time of great power competition once again, with a
rising China and a resurgent Russia challenging the United States for global hegemony. At the
same time, nationalism is rising around the world fostering regional rivalry and conflict. In an
environment where modern weaponry, including nuclear weapons, make all-out war much more
costly, proxy rivalry and conflict, including proxy warfare, is a much more attractive option. As
happened during the Cold War, the result of this orientation towards proxy conflict can lead to
the utter destruction of weaker, more divided states. Lebanon and Bosnia have both seen this
type of conflict before. It is too soon to tell whether they will see it again.
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